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Natural Gas Lock-In
Melissa Powers*
I.

INTRODUCTION

To prevent catastrophic global warming and abate the worst
consequences of climate change, the world must eliminate all fossil fuels
from the world’s energy systems and achieve net negative emissions by
the middle of the century.1 While this may seem like a daunting task, a
number of studies show it is technologically and economically feasible to
quickly transition away from fossil fuels by pursuing clean electrification
(or, more colloquially, by “electrifying everything”).2 Through this
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to Jenny
Bartos and the law review team at the University of Kansas. Thanks also to Uma Outka for organizing
an excellent symposium and thanks to Rebecca Bratspies, Robin Craig, Lara Fowler, Joshua Galperin,
Seema Kakade, Sam Kalen, Katrina Kuh, Mike Pappas, Heather Payne, J.B. Ruhl, Inara Scott, David
Takacs, Cliff Villa, and Steven Weissman for their helpful feedback.
1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5
DEGREES,
SUMMARY
FOR
POLICYMAKERS
15,
17
(2018),
http://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKE2-Z6HE].
2. See, e.g., Mark Z. Jacobson, Mark A. Delucchi, Guillaume Bazouin, Zack A.F. Bauer,
Christa C. Heavey, Emma Fisher, Sean B. Morris, Diniana J.Y. Piekutowski, Taylor A. Vencill & Tim
W. Yeskoo, 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight (WWS) All-Sector Energy
Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 ENERGY & ENV’T SCI. 2093, 2094–95 (2015); Nick Eyre, Sarah
J. Darby, Philipp Grünewald, Eoghan McKenna & Rebecca Ford, Reaching a 1.5°C Target: SocioTechnical Challenges for a Rapid Transition to Low-Carbon Electricity Systems, 376 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONAL ROYAL SOC’Y A. at 1, 5–8 (2018); SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS. NETWORK & INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELS., PATHWAYS TO DEEP CARBONIZATION 15 (2014),
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/archive/hub/publications/184548/pathways-deepdecarbonization-2014-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SDW-7EYY]; Keith Dennis, Environmentally
Beneficial Electrification: Electricity as the End-Use Option, 28 ELEC. J. 100, 103–04 (2015); Keith
Dennis, Ken Colburn & Jim Lazar, Environmentally Beneficial Electrification: The Dawn of
‘Emissions Efficiency’, 29 ELEC. J. 52, 53 (2016); SAUL GRIFFITH WITH SAM CALISCH & LAURA
FRASER, REWIRING AMERICA: A FIELD MANUAL FOR THE CLIMATE FIGHT 28 (2020); AMOL PHADKE,
UMED PALIWAL, NIKIT ABHYANKAR, TAYLOR MCNAIR, BEN PAULOS, DAVID WOOLEY & RIC
O’CONNELL,
2035:
THE
REPORT
15–16
(2020),
http://www.2035report.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/2035-Report.pdf?hsCtaTracking=8a85e9ea-4ed3-4ec0-b4c6906934306ddb%7Cc68c2ac2-1db0-4d1c-82a1-65ef4daaf6c1 [https://perma.cc/AB7E-22JT]; ERIC
LARSON, CHRIS GREIG, JESSE JENKINS, ERIN MAYFIELD, ANDREW PASCALE, CHUAN ZHANG, JOSHUA
DROSSMAN, ROBERT WILLIAMS, STEVE PACALA, ROBERT SOCOLOW, EJEONG BAIK, RICH BIRDSEY,
RICK DUKE, RYAN JONES, BEN HALEY, EMILY LESLIE, KEITH PAUSTIAN & AMY SWAN, NET-ZERO
AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS 9, 13 (2020),
https://environmenthalfcentury.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf331/files/2020-
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approach, most transportation and heating would be electrified and
electricity production would become decarbonized by replacing fossil
fuels with renewable resources. 3 Replacing cars, furnaces, and hot water
heaters that are currently fueled by oil and natural gas with electric devices
would not only enable system-wide decarbonization; it would improve
electric system reliability by integrating distributed storage and flexible
loads into the system.4 The elimination of fossil fueled-devices would also
bring a myriad of health, environmental, and social benefits by eliminating
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and local pollution caused by emissions
of nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and other harmful air pollutants,
which disproportionately affect poor communities and communities of
color.5
The clean electrification concept has gained increased support and
credibility over the past few years. In 2015, researchers at Stanford
University released studies showing that the U.S. energy system could be
run on one hundred percent renewable resources.6 While some researchers
contested some of the study’s presumptions,7 nobody seriously contested
the overarching premise that energy system decarbonization will require
12/Princeton_NZA_Interim_Report_15_Dec_2020_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW5G-8336]; see
also David Roberts, The Key to Tackling Climate Change: Electrify Everything, VOX (Oct. 27, 2017,
8:48 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything [https://perma.cc/6RF76SC7].
3. Roberts, supra note 2; GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 33–35, 39–43. Some analyses do
not aim to use only renewable resources, but include a mix of renewable, nuclear, and other resources
that can achieve net-zero emissions. GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 44–54.
4. Roberts, supra note 2; GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 55–67.
5. Lara P. Clark, Dylan B. Millet & Julian D. Marshall, National Patterns in Environmental
Injustice and Inequality: Outdoor NO2 Air Pollution in the United States, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2014),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0094431 [https://perma.cc/9QG88SAX].
6. See Jacobson et al., supra note 2, at 2094.
7. Christopher T.M. Clack, Staffan A. Qvist, Jay Apt, Morgan Bazilian, Adam R. Brandt, Ken
Caldeira, Steven J. Davis, Victor Diakov, Mark A. Handschy, Paul D.H. Hines, Paulina Jaramillo,
Daniel M. Kammen, Jane C.S. Long, M. Granger Morgan, Adam Reed, Varun Sivaram, James
Sweeney, George R. Tynan, David G. Victor, John P. Weyant & Jay F. Whitacre, Evaluation of a
Proposal for Reliable Low-Cost Grid Power with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PNAS 6722,
6723–24 (2017). The study spurred both a lawsuit and a detailed rebuttal by the 100% WWS lead
author, Mark Jacobson. See Julian Spector, Mark Jacobson Drops Lawsuit Against Critics of His
100%
Renewables
Plan,
GREENTECH
MEDIA
(Feb.
26,
2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/mark-jacobson-drops-lawsuit-against-critics-of-his100-renewables#gs.8nrhmrdK [https://perma.cc/K49J-WJZP]; MARK Z. JACOBSON, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS CONCERNING THE LAWSUIT AROUND THE PAPER PNAS 114, 6722-6727 (2017) (2018),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/CombiningRenew/18-02-FAQs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YYV-H7CE].
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displacement of fossil fuels at all levels of the energy system.8 Indeed, by
2020, several additional studies demonstrated that rapid decarbonization
of the energy system could be achieved through clean electrification of the
transportation and building sectors.9 These studies also showed that clean
electrification could be achieved using readily available technologies and
that it would cost less than continued reliance on fossil fuels.10 A nearconsensus seems to have emerged that energy system decarbonization is
not only feasible, it is the optimal solution.
But that does not mean it will be easy from a regulatory or political
perspective. Transitioning to a decarbonized energy system will require
the United States to quickly move beyond entrenched fossil fuels, which
provided nearly eighty percent of all U.S. energy in 2020.11 For decades,
researchers have warned about the risks of fossil fuel or carbon lock-in12—
the tendency for fossil fuel infrastructure to persist and create new path
dependencies that could extend its use and lock out renewable resources.13

8. Clack et al., supra note 7, at 6722. Clack and his co-authors noted at the beginning of their
critique that “it is not in question that it would be theoretically possible to build a reliable energy
system excluding all bioenergy, nuclear energy, and fossil fuel sources.” Id. Their critiques focused
on assumptions related to available storage capacity, costs, and energy system reliability. Id. at 6723–
24.
9. See GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 38, 61–62; PHADKE, supra note 2, at 31–32; see also
Joint Declaration of the Global 100% RE Strategy Group, GLOB. 100% RE STRATEGY GRP. (Feb. 9,
2021), https://global100restrategygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Joint-Declaration-of-theGlobal-100-RE-Strategy-Group-210208.pdf [https://perma.cc/62VT-R7CN].
10. See GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 55–69.
11. Bill Sanchez, Fossil Fuels Account for the Largest Share of U.S. Energy Production and
Consumption,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Sept.
14,
2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45096 [https://perma.cc/4K3W-KEM8].
12. See, e.g., Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 817, 817
(2000). Professor Unruh seems to have been the first person to label and describe “carbon lock-in” as
a specific category of path dependency. Since then, many other researchers have described, analyzed,
and attempted to document the extent of carbon and fossil fuel lock-in. See, e.g., Karen C. Seto, Steven
J. Davis, Ronald B. Mitchell, Eleanor C. Stokes, Gregory Unruh & Dianna Ürge-Vorsatz, Carbon
Lock-In: Types, Causes, and Policy Implications, 41 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RES. 425, 426–27 (2016);
Peter Erickson, Sivan Kartha, Michael Lazarus & Kevin Tempest, Assessing Carbon Lock-In, 10
ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1 (2015); Pia Buschmann & Angela Oels, The Overlooked Role of Discourse
in Breaking Carbon Lock-In: The Case of the German Energy Transition, 10 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE 1 (2019); Paul Lehmann, Felix Creutzig, Melf-Hinrich Ehlers, Nele Friedrichsen, Clemens
Heuson, Lion Hirth & Robert Pietzcker, Carbon Lock-Out: Advancing Renewable Energy Policy in
Europe, 5 ENERGIES 323 (2012). Some researchers use the term “committed emissions” to describe
the lock-in phenomenon. See, e.g., Dan Tong, Qiang Zhang, Yixuan Zheng, Ken Caldeira, Christine
Shearer, Chaopeng Hong, Yue Qin & Steven J. Davis, Committed Emissions from Existing Energy
Infrastructure Jeopardize 1.5° C Climate Target, 572 NATURE 373 (2019).
13. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 426–27.
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Although all fossil fuels are subject to lock-in,14 this article argues that
natural gas may present the most substantial lock-in challenges in the
United States because of its pervasive use in multiple parts of the energy
system. Unlike coal, which mostly fuels the electricity sector,15 and oil,
which mostly provides transportation fuels,16 natural gas is used
expansively for electricity generation, direct industrial use, in
transportation, and as a heating and cooking fuel in homes and other
buildings.17 The diverse and multiscalar uses of gas, when combined with
the other features that tend to contribute to carbon lock-in (including the
use of capital-intensive and long-lived infrastructure, institutional
structures and legal regimes that promote path dependences, and
behavioral responses that reinforce the tendency towards inertia), likely
make natural gas lock-in a significant barrier to a rapid energy transition.18
Indeed, while the transition from coal is well underway,19 and the U.S.
transition from oil could accelerate due to the relatively short lifespan of
vehicles,20 the transition from natural gas has barely begun.21
To the contrary, gas has been ascendant in the U.S. energy system
since the turn of the twenty-first century. The share of electricity supplied
by natural gas power plants in the United States reached its highest level
ever—forty-three percent—in 2020.22 The number of natural gas hookups
14. Id.; Erickson et al., supra note 12, at 1.
15. See U.S. Energy Facts Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. [hereinafter U.S. Energy
Facts,
EIA],
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energyfacts/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20U.S.%20energy%20production,energy%20and%20consumed%2
0100.2%20quads.&text=Fossil%20fuels%E2%80%94petroleum%2C%20natural%20gas,primary%2
0energy%20production%20in%202019 [https://perma.cc/7D72-UGQW] (last updated May 7, 2020).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See Sanchez, supra note 11; see also Alex Gorski, Electricity Monthly Update, Highlights:
November
2019,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Jan.
27,
2020),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/january2020/
[https://perma.cc/G3SC2PC7].
20. Gorski, supra note 19. But see Erickson et al., supra note 12, at 4–5 (concluding that lockin is particularly strong for internal combustion engines on a global level, due in part to the growing
use of personal vehicles in developing countries).
21. See Sanchez, supra note 11 (showing increases in gas and oil production and consumption).
22. See David Manowitz, Natural Gas Generators Make Up Largest Share of U.S. Electricity
Generation
Capacity,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45496 [https://perma.cc/9L5C-9ZFE] (showing
that natural gas generation accounted for forty-three percent of total capacity and thirty-nine percent
of total generation in 2019).
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for residential and commercial buildings also increased by eight percent
from 2005 to 2017, resulting in 5.7 million new natural gas customers
during that time.23 This increased dependence on natural gas was partly
the result of a deliberate campaign to paint natural gas as a “bridge” fuel
from coal to renewable resources.24 It was further enabled by the Energy
Policy Act of 2005,25 which exempted hydraulic fracturing from the Safe
Drinking Water Act,26 and by state energy policies that favored “efficient”
natural gas appliances over electric-powered ones.27 Even when experts
raised doubts that natural gas would not serve as a bridge to carbon-free
energy,28 and even when studies began to show that the lifecycle GHG
emissions from natural gas may (and, in some cases, indisputably do)
exceed the lifecycle GHG emissions from coal,29 natural gas production
and use expanded.30 This expansion continued notwithstanding warnings
from domestic and international energy experts that new fossil fuel
infrastructure would lock in GHG emissions for decades to come,
threatening climate mitigation efforts.31 Natural gas reliance also grew
23. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., THE IMPACT OF FOSSIL FUELS IN BUILDINGS: A FACT BASE 15
(2019) [hereinafter RMI, FOSSIL FUELS IN BUILDINGS]. Total gas consumption has remained flat, due
to efficiency improvements. Id. However, the new hookups will tend to create path dependencies that
could lock-in natural gas for years or decades to come. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 312, 119 Stat. 594, 688 (2005) (codified
as amended in scattered sections throughout the U.S. Code).
26. Id. at § 322; see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 729, 762 (2013).
27. See infra Part III.
28. Patrick Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the Shale
Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 328 (2013); GREG MUTTITT & LORNE STOCKMAN,
BURNING
THE
GAS
‘BRIDGE
FUEL’
MYTH
3
(2017),
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/11/gas-briefing-nov-2017-v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/67JTPWNF].
29. As early as 2011, researchers began to warn about the lifecycle emissions of greenhouse
gases associated with leaking methane from gas production, transportation, and use. See, e.g., Tom
M.L. Wigley, Coal to Gas: The Influence of Methane Leakage, 108 CLIMATIC CHANGE 601, 605–08
(2011); MARK FULTON, NILS MELLQUIST, SAYA KITASEI & JOEL BLUESTEIN, COMPARING LIFECYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL GAS AND COAL 20 (2011),
https://www.db.com/cr/en/docs/Natural_Gas_LCA_Update_082511.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MSTP93U].
30. Manowitz, supra note 22.
31. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS: WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK SPECIAL REPORT ON UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 91–92 (2012); Joe Romm, Natural Gas is a
Bridge to Nowhere Absent a Carbon Price AND Strong Standards to Reduce Methane Leakage,
THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 9, 2012, 8:50 PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/natural-gas-is-abridge-to-nowhere-absent-a-carbon-price-and-strong-standards-to-reduce-methane-b38fbff80f4f/
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despite the warnings from several investors that natural gas production
was uneconomical and the gas sector’s financing had created a potentially
devastating debt bubble.32 These dynamics suggest that natural gas has
become locked in as a dominant fuel source in the United States. Unless
the United States embarks on a strategic and ambitious plan to move
beyond gas, natural gas lock-in will undermine efforts to transition to a
decarbonized energy system.
Eliminating natural gas from the U.S. energy system will require
researchers, advocates, and policymakers to understand and address the
factors that contribute to natural gas lock-in. This article seeks to advance
that understanding by applying the concept of carbon lock-in to the
multiple levels of the U.S.’s natural gas system specifically. It argues that
the deployment of new natural gas infrastructure has already created path
dependencies due to technological, institutional, behavioral, narrative, and
legal feedback loops that mutually reinforce the use and expansion of
natural gas infrastructure. These path dependencies begin with the
deployment of capital-intensive infrastructure, such as production wells,
gas-fired power plants, and gas pipelines in the United States, that are
designed to operate and provide returns over several decades and often
stay online longer.33 This infrastructure has induced the formation of
broader technological systems, from gas processing plants to end-use
appliances, that have become reliant on and have helped reinforce the use
of natural gas.34 As the infrastructure has expanded, institutional, legal,
behavioral, and narrative forces have exacerbated the physical path
dependencies. Private institutions, including trade groups, unions,
investors, appliance manufacturers, and consumer groups, have become
increasingly reliant upon and supportive of natural gas.35 Public
institutions, including legislators and regulators, have reinforced this
reliance and extended the physical lock-in through laws and decisions that

[https://perma.cc/GAD7-CPZH].
32. See infra Part II.B.; see also BETHANY MCLEAN, SAUDI AMERICA: THE TRUTH ABOUT
FRACKING AND HOW IT’S CHANGING THE WORLD, 62–64, 121–23 (2018); RAINFOREST ACTION
NETWORK & OIL CHANGE INT’L, FRACKING FIASCO: THE BANKS THAT FUELED THE U.S. SHALE
BUST,
4–5
(2020),
https://www.ran.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/RAN_OCI_Fracking_Fiasco.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4DR-P7E5].
33. See Unruh, supra note 12, at 820–21; Seto et al., supra note 12, at 427–28; infra Part III.
34. Seto et al., supra note 12, at 428–33.
35. See id. at 437, 443; infra Part III.
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support natural gas and constrain early retirement of natural gas assets.36
Finally, human behaviors, influenced by bridge fuel and conservation
narratives, have amplified the lock-in dynamic, particularly because so
many individuals are personally invested in natural gas development and
use. Landowners rely on rents and royalties from gas production, and
owners of natural gas appliances will likely continue to use them out of
force of habit or because they have been led to believe gas appliances are
superior to their electric counterparts.37 When considered together, the
technological, institutional, legal, and behavioral tendencies toward inertia
make natural gas lock-in a significant risk.
A number of legal scholars and policy experts have recognized the
risks of carbon lock-in generally and large-scale stranded gas assets
specifically.38 This article appears to be the first to make a narrative case
that the multi-scalar nature of the gas industry makes gas lock-in in the
United States particularly pervasive. The multi-scalar nature of the gas
industry also amplifies the risks of an inequitable energy transition if
millions of people remain dependent on gas while others pursue piecemeal
clean electrification. To ensure a just energy transition, we must get a
handle on the scale of gas lock-in. Accordingly, this article concludes with
three brief recommendations.39 First, it encourages researchers to
complete an empirical study of the multi-scalar nature of U.S. gas lock-in
based on the drivers of lock-in discussed in this paper. Existing empirical
analyses either assess fossil fuel lock-in on a global level,40 or the potential
stranded costs risks associated with major gas infrastructure,41 but there
36. Amy L. Stein, Breaking Energy Path Dependencies, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 560 (2017);
Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy
Transition Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2018); Sam Kalen, A Bridge To Nowhere? Our
Energy Transition and the Natural Gas Pipeline Wars, 9 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 319, 324 (2020);
Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645,
647 (2017).
37. Even though new electric replacements are more affordable and safe than existing gas
equipment, the “endowment effect” suggests that people will still use their gas appliances. See
generally Gary M. Lucas, Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 115
(2017) (discussing the public’s cognitive bias against a carbon tax); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L.
Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
38. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1022; Kalen, supra note 36, at 321–23;
Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 678–84.
39. I will examine how to break gas lock-in in greater detail in a future article.
40. See Erickson et al., supra note 12, at 1, 5.
41. CHARLES TEPLIN, MARK DYSON, ALEX ENGEL & GRANT GLAZER, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
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appears to be no empirical study that considers the multi-scalar dynamics
of gas lock-in or how uneven decarbonization policies could amplify
existing energy injustices. Second, however, this article recommends that
advocates and policymakers continue to pursue near-term actions to
prevent new natural gas infrastructure from coming online, because new
infrastructure deployment instigates lock-in.42 Although there is a risk that
preventing new infrastructure could create near-term energy inequities, the
potential scale of lock-in suggests that it would be worse for lower-income
households to extend new gas service where it does not already exist.
Third, the article encourages policymakers to engage in strategic planning
and policy design to address existing gas lock-in.
The promising narrative around clean electrification may lead some to
believe that technological and market forces negate the need for strategic
planning. But that misapprehends the force of carbon lock-ins, which
simultaneously locks out decarbonized resources.43 To ensure a quick,
equitable, and strategic transition from natural gas resources to carbonfree infrastructure and resources, policymakers must think and act
strategically.
Part II of this article explains how natural gas secured its image as a
bridge fuel and how that reputation enabled its expansion and lock-in.
This part then shows how, despite gas’s growth, it is still feasible for the
United States to quickly transition from fossil fuels and avoid the worst
consequences of climate change through clean electrification. With this
optimistic goal in mind, Part III then explains how transitioning away from
natural gas will present numerous challenges due to the myriad of laws
and behaviors that promote natural gas lock-in. Part IV concludes with a
few brief recommendations that encourage empiricists to test this article’s
narrative claims, support sustained action to prevent new lock-in, and
advocate for broader strategic planning and implementation to ensure a
quick and equitable transition away from gas and towards a decarbonized
INST., THE GROWING MARKET FOR CLEAN ENERGY PORTFOLIOS: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR A
SHIFT FROM NEW GAS-FIRED GENERATION TO CLEAN ENERGY ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 9 (2019); MARK DYSON, GRANT GLAZER & CHARLES TEPLIN, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN INST., PROSPECTS FOR GAS PIPELINES IN THE ERA OF CLEAN ENERGY: HOW CLEAN
ENERGY PORTFOLIOS ARE REDUCING U.S. POWER SECTOR DEMAND FOR NATURAL GAS AND
CREATING STRANDED ASSET RISKS FOR GAS PIPELINES 9–11 (2019).
42. This includes preventing the deployment of new infrastructure through state and local bans
on new infrastructure development, increased state and federal oversight of utility investments, bans
on new leasing and drilling on public lands, subsidy reform, and continued advocacy and litigation to
prevent new investments.
43. Unruh, supra note 12, at 822–23.
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energy system. This article concludes that the movement towards a
decarbonized energy system is likely inevitable, due to the falling costs of
renewable resources and storage technologies. But quick and equitable
decarbonization depends on more than just markets. It requires the United
States to re-embrace effective governance so we can quickly break free
from natural gas lock-in.
II. FROM THE GAS BRIDGE TO CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION
In 2005, natural gas provided about eighteen percent of U.S. electricity
supply.44 By 2019, natural gas supplied thirty-nine percent of U.S.
electricity generation,45 accounted for forty-three percent of U.S.
electricity capacity,46 and comprised thirty-two percent of total energy
supply.47 This rapid expansion of gas as an energy fuel was actually
decades in the making, as the gas industry and federal agencies developed
new technologies to access previously unavailable gas supplies.48 But gas
received an extra boost when the Center for American Progress published
a short paper in 2009 touting natural gas as an ideal bridge fuel from coal
to clean energy.49 Although this portrait of gas as a beneficial, if not

44. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1027; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELEC.
POWER
ANNUAL
2015
tbl.
3.1.A
(2016),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/pdf/03482015.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ3N-HBA2];
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELEC. POWER ANNUAL 2019 tbl. 3.1.A (2021),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YWN-C9AQ].
45. Manowitz, supra note 22.
46. Id.
47. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE AND SECTOR (2019),
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/flow/css_2019_energy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2TC-P7PB].
48. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 327–31 (2012) (describing how an independent driller, George Mitchell, perfected
the process to produce natural gas from shale).
49. JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & ENERGY FUTURE
COAL., NATURAL GAS: A BRIDGE FUEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2009),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/08/pdf/naturalgasmemo.pdf?_ga=2.12985854.87887091.160338444841811474.1603384448 [https://perma.cc/X56X-RUHH]. Barry Commoner had actually called
natural gas a “bridging fuel” three decades earlier in 1979. See Kate Sheppard & Alyssa Battistoni,
Timeline: How We Learned to Love—and Hate—Natural Gas, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 2, 2012),
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2012/04/history-of-natural-gas-fracking/
[https://perma.cc/UY78-SS5E]. At the time, the concept likely had little influence due to the high
prices of natural gas.
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benign, fuel was quickly contested,50 the bridge fuel image stuck.
Increased gas investment and development thus became integral parts of a
moderate approach towards decarbonization.51 Even as the climate crisis
worsened and calls for deep emissions reductions grew louder and more
urgent, gas was still seen as a lesser of evils in comparison to dirtier coal
and oil and more affordable than renewable resources.52 Then, when the
costs of renewable energy began to fall, the gas industry emphasized the
role gas could play supporting renewable energy integration, energy
system reliability, and the use of hydrogen.53 As a result, natural gas has
only recently faced real pressure, after several studies began to show that
energy system decarbonization could be achieved through increased
electrification of end uses that are typically fueled by oil and gas.54
Numerous models now show that clean electrification can result in a more
dependable, affordable, and nimble energy system than the one we have
today.55 If clean electrification becomes a reality, this could mean that the
gas bridge may finally reach its terminus. This section will describe how
50. See, e.g., Wigley, supra note 29, at 607; Fulton et al., supra note 29, at 20; see also Hannah
Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the
Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 115, 127–42 (2009) (discussing concerns
about hydraulic fracturing’s impacts on groundwater).
51. See, e.g., STEPHEN P.A. BROWN, ALAN J. KRUPNICK & MARGARET A. WALLS, RES. FOR
THE FUTURE & NAT. ENERGY POL’Y INST., NATURAL GAS: A BRIDGE TO A LOW-CARBON FUTURE?
1–3 (2009), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-IB-09-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFW-8AAA];
ALEX TREMBATH, MAX LUKE, MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE BREAKTHROUGH
INST., COAL KILLER: HOW NATURAL GAS FUELS THE CLEAN ENERGY REVOLUTION 4–9 (2013),
https://thebreakthrough.org/articles/coal-killer [https://perma.cc/DR9A-3WGE]; Bryan Walsh,
Exclusive: How the Sierra Club Took Millions from the Natural Gas Industry—and Why They Stopped,
TIME (Feb. 2, 2012), http://science.time.com/2012/02/02/exclusive-how-the-sierra-club-tookmillions-from-the-natural-gas-industry-and-why-they-stopped/ [https://perma.cc/UTZ2-F69Z]. The
Sierra Club’s affiliation with the natural gas industry caused a great deal of controversy. At the time
it accepted the money, the Sierra Club was leading a potent campaign against coal, opposing new coalfired power plants and expansion of existing ones. Having the ability to promote natural gas as an
affordable and available alternative to coal may have propped up the Sierra Club’s campaign.
Although some researchers have described natural gas as a coal killer, see TREMBATH ET AL., supra
note 51, they have not shown that any specific proposed coal plant was closed due to natural gas.
52. See Justin Gillis, Picking Lesser of Two Climate Evils, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/science/climate-methane-global-warming.html
[https://perma.cc/FJZ4-L24S].
53. See David R. Baker, Vanessa Dezem, Gerson Freitas & Naureen S. Malik, With Natural Gas
in Peril, Pipeline Owners Look to Hydrogen, BLOOMBERG GREEN (Jan. 29, 2021, 3:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-29/with-natural-gas-in-peril-pipeline-ownerslook-to-hydrogen [https://perma.cc/DSA6-C3SW].
54. See generally supra note 2 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
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the image of natural gas as a bridge fuel enabled the expansion of gas and
explain why it should be treated as an unnecessary and harmful fossil fuel
that should be slated for elimination due to clean electrification.
A. Building the Natural Gas Bridge
In 2009, the Center for American Progress published a policy memo
co-authored by John D. Podesta (former Chief of Staff to President Bill
Clinton) and Timothy E. Wirth (former Democratic Colorado Senator)
describing natural gas as a bridge fuel.56 These and other bridge fuel
proponents argued the rise of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
technologies for oil and gas extraction would enable the production of
massive amounts of low-cost natural gas resources and facilitate fuelswitching away from coal in the electricity sector.57 Gas-fired power
plants would also serve as backup resources for renewable resources,
enabling their growth.58 Eventually (although many bridge fuel arguments
did not identify the ultimate destination of the bridge), carbon capture
technology would become available to sequester the carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from natural gas combustion or zero-carbon energy resources
would displace natural gas resources. Although some natural gas bridge
proponents were careful to emphasize that natural gas’s ability to facilitate
decarbonization depended on accompanying policies that would regulate
or tax carbon emissions,59 others viewed increased natural gas use as a
sufficient end goal in and of itself or failed to fully explain where the
bridge might end.60 Regardless, the depiction of natural gas as a bridge
fuel proved compelling to many and thus helped justify an acceleration of
natural gas development and use across the United States.
In reality, the rise of natural gas predated its supposed role as a bridge
fuel by years, if not decades. Well before natural gas was touted as a
climate mitigation fuel, energy experts were promoting its ability to
provide abundant, low-cost, domestic energy supplies, thanks to
improvements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling
56. PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 49.
57. Id. at 1; see also, e.g., BROWN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1; TREMBATH ET AL., supra note 51,
at 4–9.
58. TREMBATH ET AL., supra note 51, at 28–32.
59. See BROWN et al., supra note 51, at 2–3.
60. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32 UTAH
ENV’T L. REV. 245, 245 (2012).
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technologies.61 After decades of research, natural gas drillers successfully
commercialized hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (collectively
referred to in this article as “fracking”) technologies that would allow them
to produce shale gas that would not otherwise have been economically
viable to exploit.62 The gas industry realized, however, that hydraulic
fracturing would require—and contaminate—large quantities of water,
treatment and disposal of which would be complicated and costly under
applicable environmental laws. To avoid these costs, the industry sought
and received exemptions from key federal environmental statutes63 and
thus was able to begin expansive hydraulic fracturing operations with little
environmental oversight.64 Natural gas production rapidly increased.65
A backlash against natural gas development and production quickly
followed. Much of the early backlash focused on concerns regarding the
potential for hydraulic fracturing practices to contaminate underground
drinking water. In 2010, a documentary film, Gasland, stirred up
widespread national concerns about the potential for hydraulic fracturing
to cause contamination of drinking water and other groundwater
supplies.66 The film famously showed homeowners lighting their tap
water on fire and suggested that the fracking process caused drinking water
to become flammable.67 Although the natural gas industry and some

61. See Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2013). Hydraulic fracturing itself is not a new process; it has existed for
nearly seven decades. Id. The natural gas boom instead resulted from a combination of hydraulic
fracturing and horizontal drilling, along with the development of chemical mixtures and the use of
“proppants” to hold open underground fractures. YERGIN, supra note 48, at 327–31.
62. YERGIN, supra note 48 at 327–31. Shale gas consists of pockets of natural gas that occur in
rock formations. Id. Accessing these pockets was economically and commercially unviable without
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. Id. These two technologies enabled access to many more
of the gas pockets from a single drilling site. Id.
63. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified as amended
in scattered sections throughout the U.S. Code); see also Emily C. Powers, Note, Fracking and
Federalism: Support for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons,
19 J.L. & POL’Y 913, 938–40 (2011).
64. See Tom Hamburger & Alan C. Miller, Halliburton’s Interests Assisted by White House,
L.A. Times, (Oct. 14, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/14/nation/na-frac14
[https://perma.cc/HYF2-VDPG].
65. See Robert B. Jackson, Avner Vengosh, J. William Carey, Richard J. Davies, Thomas H.
Darrah, Francis O’Sullivan & Gabrielle Pétron, The Environmental Costs and Benefits of Fracking,
39 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RSCH. 327, 329 (2014) (noting that daily production of natural gas increased
from thirty million cubic feet in 2005 to more than 700 million cubic feet in 2012).
66. GASLAND (Int’l WOW Co. 2010).
67. Id.
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regulatory agencies contested the accuracy of some of the claims made in
Gasland,68 concerns about groundwater contamination persisted. Indeed,
concerns about the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on groundwater
predated the release of Gasland,69 and they have never fully abated.70
Fracking was also linked to wasteful use of scarce water resources, surface
water contamination, increased localized air pollution, degradation of
habitat for imperiled species, and earthquakes.71 In response to these
concerns, some states enacted a moratorium on fracking new wells,72 while
other jurisdictions increased regulation over certain aspects of the fracking
process.73 To avoid additional moratoria, after initially denying any claims
about the potential environmental harms associated with fracking, the
natural gas industry formed a partnership with some national
environmental groups to develop “best practices” for hydraulic
fracturing.74
Perhaps thanks to these “best practices” or because natural gas seemed
to present an easy near-term solution to addressing climate change, the
image of natural gas as a lower-emitting, climate-friendly bridge fuel

68. Joshua P. Fershee, Facts, Fiction, and Perception in Hydraulic Fracturing: Illuminating Act
13 and Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 116 W. V A. L. REV. 819, 822–23
(2014).
69. See Wiseman, supra note 50, at 137.
70. Jackson et al., supra note 65, at 354 (noting that a survey of groundwater contamination
incidents suggests “that most incidents originate from the surface, including faulty wells, wastewater
disposal, and spills and leaks from surface operations”).
71. See Michael Wines, New Research Links Scores of Earthquakes to Fracking Wells Near a
Fault in Ohio, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/us/new-researchlinks-scores-of-earthquakes-to-fracking-wells-near-a-fault-in-ohio.html
[https://perma.cc/36T9ADP2].
72. See Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York State, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-innew-york-state-citing-healthrisks.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&p
gtype=article [https://perma.cc/M2WH-Q8GL]; Héctor Herrera, The Legal Status of Fracking
Worldwide: An Environmental Law and Human Rights Perspective, GLOB. NETWORK FOR HUM. RTS.
& THE ENV’T (Jan. 6, 2020), https://gnhre.org/2020/01/06/the-legal-status-of-fracking-worldwide-anenvironmental-law-and-human-rights-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/G4V5-LT7Z].
73. Norimitsu Onishi, California’s Thirst Shapes Debate Over Fracking, N.Y. Times (May 14,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/us/californias-thirst-shapes-debate-over-fracking.html
[https://perma.cc/J999-E6TQ].
74. Strategic Partners, SUSTAINABLE, https://www.sustainableshale.org/strategic-partners/
[https://perma.cc/8D29-WCDZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (describing the Center for Sustainable
Shale Development as an “unprecedented” collaboration of environmental and industry stakeholders).
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gained steam.75 Electricity generation from natural gas emits about half
the greenhouse gases as generation from coal76 and only a small fraction
of other pollutants.77 Gas advocates thus promoted the replacement of coal
with gas.78 Natural gas advocates argued that natural gas would provide
lower-emitting critical backup power for intermittent renewables, 79 and
they claimed that the lower costs of building natural gas plants would
allow utilities and utility regulators to easily scrap newly constructed
natural gas plants once renewable energy resources matured and problems
related to intermittency and reliability were addressed.80 Gas was thus
viewed as a win-win solution. Electric utilities began to invest heavily in
new natural gas plants or to negotiate contracts for gas-based electricity.81
Natural gas producers, transporters, and distribution utilities further
exploited the positive bridge fuel image, building pipelines, export
terminals, and other infrastructure designed to last beyond forty or fifty
years.82
As the bridge fuel messaging was expanding, scientists began to
challenge the purported climate benefits of natural gas in comparison to
coal. The scientific debate about the lifecycle emissions of unconventional
natural gas production ignited into controversy in 2011, when scientists
began to estimate how leaking methane from natural gas production could
offset the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that result from burning
natural gas instead of coal.83 One influential study by a climate scientist at
the National Center for Atmospheric Research concluded that leakage
rates would have to stay below two percent for natural gas to be more
climate-friendly than coal.84 Then, in 2012, a pair of studies concluded
that the lifecycle emissions of greenhouse gases from natural gas likely

75. Kalen, supra note 36, at 330–31; Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1026–27.
76. How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11 [https://perma.cc/FGA3-FQUQ]
(last reviewed June 17, 2020).
77. TREMBATH ET AL., supra note 51, 38–39.
78. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1026–27.
79. TREMBATH ET AL., supra note 51, at 28–32.
80. An
Unconventional
Bonanza,
Economist
(July
14,
2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21558432 [https://perma.cc/2KJT-H395].
81. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1027–28; Manowitz, supra note 22.
82. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1032–33.
83. Wigley, supra note 29, at 602; FULTON ET AL., supra note 29, at 7–12.
84. Wigley, supra note 29, at 607.
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exceed those of coal, due to methane leakage.85 These studies sparked
intense debates among scientists regarding how much methane actually
leaks from gas operations, the proper numbers to use when comparing
methane to carbon dioxide, and a number of other fundamental issues
regarding lifecycle emissions calculations.86 These debates likely
benefitted the gas sector, which used the uncertainty to delay or prevent
regulation of the gas sector’s GHG emissions. The delay tactics worked:
the Obama Administration did not finalize regulations to regulate fracking
or reduce methane leakage from the oil and gas sector until the end of its
second term,87 and the Trump Administration quickly stayed and then
rescinded the regulations.88 Natural gas thus enjoyed a regulatory free ride
for about a decade after concerns about methane leakage emerged. Not
only did this enable the expansion of gas infrastructure; it likely worsened
the climate crisis, as scientists warned might happen. Their warnings were
largely affirmed in 2019, when studies showed that natural gas is worse
than coal from a climate perspective if the leakage rate exceeds one
85. See Robert W. Howarth, Drew Shindell, Renee Santoro, Anthony Ingraffea, Nathan Phillips
& Amy Townsend-Small, Methane Emissions From Natural Gas Systems (2012),
http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/publications/Howarth_et_al_2012_National_Climate_Assessme
nt.pdf [https://perma.cc/H98B-C7VF]; see also Romm, supra note 31.
86. Parenteau & Barnes, supra note 28, at 334–38. Methane is a potent, but short-lived,
greenhouse gas. Methane lasts in the atmosphere for about a decade. A ton of methane is about 137
times as potent as carbon dioxide over a ten-year span, eighty-four times as potent over a twenty-year
span, and approximately twenty-five to thirty-five times as potent as carbon dioxide over one hundred
years. See Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Understanding Global Warming Potentials, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials
[https://perma.cc/TCJ7-2QYS] (last visited Apr. 26, 2021). For years, when climate scientists thought
the Earth would have much more time to prevent the manifestation of climate impacts, they tended to
measure the impacts of greenhouse gases on a one-hundred-year scale. Steven Ferrey, The Second
Element, First Priority, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 41, 47 (2018). However, as the impacts of climate
change grew more severe and began manifesting much more quickly than anticipated, climate
scientists began to look for ways to avoid near-term warming impacts. Eliminating high-potency
short-lived climate forcers, like methane, could further that objective, and not only prevent some nearterm consequences of a rapidly warming climate but also provide societies time to transition away
from carbon dioxide, which is more prevalent and long-lived. See id. at 42–44.
87. See Dan Utech, Administration Takes Historic Action to Reduce Methane Emissions for the
Oil and Gas Sector, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (May 12, 2016, 2:45
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/12/administration-takes-historic-actionreduce-methane-emission-oil-and-gas-sector [https://perma.cc/F346-ZV66]; Oil and Natural Gas
Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35823 (June
3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Source Determination for Certain Emissions Units in the
Oil and Natural Gas Sector, 81 Fed. Reg. 35622 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 70, 71); Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16128 (Mar.
26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 3160); see also Kalen, supra note 36, at 334–37.
88. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 337–38.
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percent, and the studies demonstrated the average leakage rates exceeded
two percent.89
Even as scientists were debating the impacts of natural gas on the
climate, the gas industry and its proponents had shifted the focus of their
pro-gas arguments. Rather than rely exclusively on the purported benefits
of gas versus coal, they focused on the potential for natural gas plants to
help integrate renewable resources.90 Natural gas plants that were already
designed to operate as flexible, dispatchable resources to provide peak
power were promoted as useful for integrating renewable electricity.91
Gas advocates therefore argued that natural gas could complement
renewable energy resources and enable their expansion. While some
renewable energy advocates rejected these claims—noting that gas and
renewables in fact compete with each other in energy markets and for
investment92—gas’s reputation as a fuel to support and integrate
renewable resources grew. So, when the purported climate benefits of
natural gas came under increased scrutiny, the focus on natural gas as a
companion to renewable energy intensified.
This claimed benefit of natural gas has also grown weaker over time,
as storage and other non-carbon resources capable of storing and
integrating renewable resources have matured and their prices have
dropped.93 In response, natural gas proponents have begun to spin other
89. See Stephen Leahy, Fracking Boom Tied to Methane Spike in Earth’s Atmosphere, Nat’l
Geographic (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/08/frackingboom-tied-to-methane-spike-in-earths-atmosphere/ [https://perma.cc/SZ84-YZU3].
90. See Parenteau & Barnes, supra note 28, at 353; see also AGA’s McCurdy Discusses Impact
of Low Natural Gas Prices on Infrastructure Development, E&E TV (Sept. 13, 2012),
https://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1571/transcript [https://perma.cc/NHW3-D2J9].
91. Id.
92. See Isaac Arnsdorf, Is Natural Gas Sucking Investment from Renewable Energy?,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (May 29, 2014), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/windpower/is-natural-gas-sucking-investment-from-renewable-energy/#gref
[https://perma.cc/QQ65XMYV]; Henry D. Jacoby, Francis M. O’Sullivan & Sergey Paltsev, The Influence of Shale Gas on
U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy, 1 ECONS. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 37, 50 (2012);
Matthew L. Wald, The Potential Downside of Natural Gas, N.Y. Times (June 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/energy-environment/the-potential-downside-ofnatural-gas.html?ref=business&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/5RAD-GCA7].
93. See Sara Hoff & Alexander Mey, Utility-Scale Battery Storage Costs Decreased Nearly
70% Between 2015 and 2018, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45596
[https://perma.cc/7X25-M2YK]; YIYI
ZHOU, LOGAN GOLDIE-SCOT, DARIO TRAUM, ALBERT CHEUNG, & ANGUS MCCRONE, HOW PVPLUS-STORAGE WILL COMPETE WITH GAS GENERATION IN THE U.S., BLOOMBERGNEF, 1, 18–27
(2020),
https://assets.bbhub.io/professional/sites/24/BloombergNEF-How-PV-Plus-Storage-Will-
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versions of the gas bridge tale. Some electric utilities and gas advocates
now assert that new natural gas plants are necessary to ensure resource
adequacy—i.e., sufficient amounts of available electric capacity—to
ensure electric system reliability.94 Natural gas utilities also claim that
additional natural gas infrastructure could help deliver zero-carbon
hydrogen fuel to end users.95 While it is too soon to tell whether investors
and regulators will buy into that image, the idea of natural gas as a bridge
fuel to a decarbonized future persists.
This image has been complemented by a narrative focused on
increasing end use of natural gas in homes and other buildings in the name
of conservation. Since the 1970s, much of U.S. energy policy has focused
on energy efficiency.96 This policy focus enabled natural gas to gain a
foothold in the appliance industry because many older electric resistance
devices have much lower efficiency ratings than their natural gas
counterparts.97 Natural gas heating became more affordable than electric
heating due to these efficiency improvements.98 Moreover, because home
heating is a seasonal phenomenon, replacing electric heating with gas
heating had more acute impacts on energy bills. Gas was therefore
marketed as the clean and affordable energy choice.99 To further expand
its foothold in buildings, the gas industry added another message to its
marketing campaign for gas stoves: they were sold as a luxury item for
discerning home and professional chefs.100 More recently, the bridge fuel
Compete-With-Gas-Generation-in-the-U.S.-Nov-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ5E-66MF].
94. See Reforming Resource Adequacy: First, Establish Where We’re Going, GRIDWORKS (Dec.
14,
2020),
https://gridworks.org/2020/12/californias-future-ra-program-are-interim-proposalsheading-in-the-right-direction-first-we-need-to-know-more-about-where-were-going/?author=1
[https://perma.cc/39JP-62U3].
95. Baker et al., supra note 53.
96. See GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 27–28 (discussing conservation as a legacy of 1970s
thinking).
97. See Dennis, supra note 2, at 101–02; Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54.
98. Dennis, supra note 2, at 101–02.
99. See Gas vs. Electric Heating, Which is Better For the Environment?, Evergreen: Home
Heating & Energy (July 10, 2017), https://evergreenhomeheatingandenergy.com/blog/146142
[https://perma.cc/AVC4-KJ38]; Rosemary Avance, Gas vs Electric Appliances: Save Money and
Energy by Researching Your Appliance Options, Consumer Affairs (last updated Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/homeowners/gas-vs-electric-appliances.html
[https://perma.cc/6UM7-MKG2]; Gas Appliances vs. Electric Appliances: Which are Better for Your
Energy
Bills?,
Think
Energy,
https://www.thinkenergy.com/gas-vs-electric-appliances
[https://perma.cc/26MP-6MQ4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
100. See Rebecca Leber, How the Fossil Fuel Industry Convinced Americans to Love Gas Stoves,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2021/02/how-the-fossil-
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arguments that supported increased gas use for electricity generation
began to creep into gas appliance marketing, with home energy specialists
invoking the bridge fuel arguments in blogs that compare gas to electric
appliances.101 Indeed, as pressure to “electrify everything” increases, it
seems that the natural gas industry will want to double down on the
narrative that it is merely a bridge to a decarbonized future.
B. Electrifying Everything to Decarbonize
This portrayal of the gas bridge, however, is facing perhaps its biggest
test as more communities and policymakers in the United States embrace
clean electrification. Commonly called the “electrify everything” model
of decarbonization,102 clean electrification involves electrifying end uses
that are typically fueled by oil or gas, rapidly replacing fossil-fired power
plants with renewable generation and improving energy efficiency
throughout the system.103 While some clean electrification models
anticipate a minute role for natural gas over the next few decades,104 others
show that the United States could get all of its energy from carbon-free
resources.105
The first study to show the potential of clean electrification was
published in 2015 by researchers at Stanford University, who claimed the
United States could meet all of its energy needs from water, wind, and
solar by 2050.106 The 100% WWS study showed that, by increasing
reliance on electricity produced by hydropower, wind power, and solar
power, the United States could both eliminate fossil fuels from the
electricity, heating, and transportation systems while lowering overall
energy consumption.107 Their study followed other countries’ energy
decarbonization models, which similarly used a clean electricity system as
the backbone for decarbonized heating and transportation.108 However,
fuel-industry-convinced-americans-to-love-gas-stoves/ [https://perma.cc/MXK9-FR4V].
101. See Gas vs. Electric Heating, Which is Better For the Environment?, supra note 99.
102. Roberts, supra note 2.
103. Id.; GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 33–35, 39–43.
104. LARSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 87.
105. Jacobson et al., supra note 2, at 2093–94.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 2094–97.
108. See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Sustainable Energy: Wind, Water and Solar
Technologies Can Provide 100 Percent of the World’s Energy, Eliminating All Fossil Fuels. Here’s
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the sheer scale and ambition of the 100% WWS model attracted a great
deal of attention, and, at times, criticism from other researchers who
believed the studies’ exclusion of nuclear energy would make U.S.
decarbonization more expensive and less reliable than necessary.109 As
different energy experts debated back and forth, through publications in
well-regarded scientific journals and, briefly, through a lawsuit, the most
important message of the 100% WWS study—namely, that clean
electrification of the energy system would enable swift decarbonization—
seemed to get lost.
But not for long. While the debates about the 100% WWS study played
out, two studies were published, one by researchers affiliated with the
Regulatory Assistance Project,110 that the energy reporter David Roberts
came to describe as the “electrify everything” model to decarbonization.111
The studies argued that the U.S. focus on end-use energy efficiency was
undermining decarbonization goals.112 For years, state and federal energy
policy had promoted the deployment and use of natural gas-fueled
appliances, including stoves, water heaters, and furnaces, because they had
higher efficiency ratings than their electric counterparts.113 Because
energy conservation was a key goal of energy policy, policies encouraged
customers to install more efficient gas equipment to save energy and
money.114 Keith Dennis challenged this perspective, arguing that these
efficiency arguments made sense only by considering end-use efficiency
in isolation.115 However, if policymakers were to consider system-wide
energy efficiency, including energy losses at the power plants and along
the transmission system, continued deployment of natural gas appliances
would be less efficient than deployment of electric ones.116 As upstream
power plants become more efficient due to the phase out of older coal
How, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 58 (Nov. 2009); see also Henrik Lund & Brian V. Mathiesen, Energy
System Analysis of 100% Renewable Energy Systems: The Case of Denmark in Years 2030 and 2050,
34 ENERGY 524 (2009); INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY TRANSITIONS
OUTLOOK: 1.5 C PATHWAY (2021), https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/March/World-EnergyTransitions-Outlook [https://perma.cc/4X8N-JE3V].
109. See Clack et al., supra note 7, at 6723.
110. Dennis, supra note 2; Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2.
111. Roberts, supra note 2.
112. Dennis, supra note 2, at 101–02; Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54.
113. See Dennis, supra note 2, at 101–02; Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54.
114. See GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 27–28.
115. Dennis, supra note 2, at 101–02, 109–11.
116. Id. at 101–04.
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plants, only electric appliances would realize those efficiency gains.117
Finally, unlike gas appliances, electric appliances (along with electric
vehicles) could be programmed to both store excess electricity and to
operate with more flexibility, enabling more integration of renewable
resources—including intermittent renewable resources—into the electric
grid.118 These researchers thus promoted a shift towards what they called
“beneficial electrification,”119 which would become known as the
“electrify everything” decarbonization model.
Since the publication of the Regulatory Assistance Project’s papers,
many other studies and models have supported the electrify everything
approach to decarbonization.120 They also confirm that rapid energy
system decarbonization is possible using available and affordable
technologies. Saul Griffith, a MacArthur Genius and the author of
Rewiring America, explains this approach quite succinctly: “We need to
decarbonize supply at the same rate as we decarbonize demand, and that
means powering electric machines with zero carbon electricity.”121 In
other words, every end-use device that is currently fueled with oil, gas, or
another fossil fuel must be replaced with electric vehicles, heat pumps,
stoves, and heaters,122 and electricity supply must come from a diverse mix
of emissions-free resources.123
C. The End of Gas?
So, what is the role of gas under these electrify everything models?
Under most of them, gas will either be phased out entirely or play a very
limited role as an emergency backup fuel source. Natural gas furnaces,
117. Id. at 103–04; Dennis, Colburn, & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54, 56–57.
118. Dennis, supra note 2, at 103–04; Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54.
119. Dennis, Colburn & Lazar, supra note 2, at 54.
120. See, e.g., GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2; PHADKE ET AL., supra note 2; LARSON ET AL.,
supra note 2.
121. GRIFFITH ET AL., supra note 2, at 29.
122. Id. at 31.
123. Id. at 44–54. Griffith avoids taking a hard position on nuclear power. Instead of drawing a
hard line in favor of or against nuclear or any other carbon-free energy research, he argues that all
zero-carbon resources should be considered for including in a decarbonized energy system, so long as
debates about which resources are superior do not slow down the transition to decarbonized resources.
See id. at 54 (“There will be trade-offs. More nuclear means fewer batteries but more public resistance
and most likely higher costs. More solar and wind means more land use. What we cannot afford are
plans that make no progress because we are wasting time arguing over these issues before we begin,
or because we are over-investing in things that can’t scale up sufficiently.”).
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water heaters, and stoves should become obsolete and be replaced with
electric appliances.124 To the extent natural gas persists in the energy
system, some models indicate that natural gas power plants might operate
at less than ten percent of capacity by 2050 and remain inoperative the
remainder of the time.125 Presumably, those who promoted natural gas as
a bridge between coal and renewable resources would accept, if not
welcome, this diminished role for natural gas and embrace its
displacement. But the gas industry—and those who depend on it for jobs,
income, and investment—will not.126 Even if they did, the infrastructure
built to produce, transport, deliver, and consume natural gas creates the
risk that natural gas could be locked into the U.S. energy system for
decades to come unless policymakers act to prevent new infrastructure
development and accelerate an equitable transition away from existing
infrastructure.
III. GAS LOCK-IN
In 2011, the International Energy Agency (IEA) warned that fossil fuel
infrastructure development was locking the world into an unsustainable
high-carbon future.127 Its 2011 World Energy Outlook noted that existing
infrastructure would have to be retired and decommissioned prematurely
and cautioned against new fossil fuel infrastructure investments.128 Even
as the IEA seemed to herald the world’s entry into a “Golden Age of Gas,”
it simultaneously warned that overreliance on gas would put the globe on
a dangerous climate trajectory.129 Many environmental advocacy
organizations echoed these messages, noting that decarbonization could
result in massive liabilities associated with stranded natural gas assets.130
The United States did not heed these warnings. Instead, it quickly
expanded its gas infrastructure, creating the very physical lock-in the IEA
124. See id. at 31.
125. See, e.g., LARSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 87 (noting that in some decarbonization scenarios,
gas generation would operate at just seven percent of current capacity level).
126. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 322 n.18 (noting gas industry assertions that gas is a destination,
not a bridge); Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1032 n.61 (finding no evidence that the gas
industry itself committed to a bridge narrative).
127. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011: ARE WE ENTERING A GOLDEN
AGE
OF
GAS?
38
(2011),
https://www.iea.org/reports/are-we-entering-a-golden-age
[https://perma.cc/8745-RHDJ].
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id.
130. See Romm, supra note 31; MUTTITT & STOCKMAN, supra note 28, at 2–3.
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had cautioned against.
Troublingly, this physical lock-in—the
development of physical assets that are destined to remain in place for
decades to come—tends to be self-reinforcing, due to institutional,
regulatory, and behavioral dynamics that promote energy system inertia
and extended path dependencies. This section will first describe the nature
and types of carbon lock-in. It will then explain how the U.S. natural gas
system is particularly prone to multiple types of lock-in. Accordingly,
without targeted efforts to prevent the development of new natural gas
infrastructure and to retire existing infrastructure prematurely, the United
States may otherwise be destined to continue its reliance on gas for
decades to come, despite the movement towards clean electrification.
A. Carbon Lock-In
The concepts of lock-in and path dependencies have long been of
interest to economists, political scientists, and other social scientists.131 In
very simple terms, lock-in refers to the truism that existing things and
actors tend to persist and self-replicate, due to physical, institutional,
economic, legal, and behavioral dynamics that favor incumbents and
disincentivize risk.132 Although scientists, scholars, and policymakers
have raised concerns about fossil fuel lock-in for decades, Professor
Gregory Unruh was the first published scholar to warn specifically about
“carbon lock-in,”133 through which technological and institutional inertia
locks in carbon-intensive-infrastructure and locks out decarbonization
technologies.134 Since then, several researchers have recognized the lockin risks that result from the tendency of carbon-emitting technologies to
persist over time and to create new carbon-intensive path dependencies.135
This research has identified a number of causes and types of carbon lockin, including infrastructural and technological lock-in, institutional lockin, behavioral lock-in, and discursive lock-in.136 Although these types of
131. Stein, supra note 36, at 560.
132. Id.
133. See Unruh, supra note 12.
134. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 426–27.
135. See, e.g., Erickson et al., supra note 12; Stein, supra note 36; Joseph P. Tomain, Smart
Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved the Planet, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 417, 429 (2006) (discussing the
“remarkable staying power” of fossil fuels); Lehmann et al., supra note 12.
136. See generally Seto et al., supra note 12 (examining infrastructural, technological,
institutional, and behavioral lock-in); Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12 (examining the influence of
discursive lock-in on other forms of carbon lock-in); infra Part III.A.2.d. (discussing various aspects
of legal lock-in).
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lock-in are often interdependent and mutually reinforcing, a description of
the different categories of carbon lock-in provides a basis for
understanding the pervasive nature of natural gas lock-in more
specifically.
1. Carbon Lock-In Explained
Gregory Unruh’s 2000 paper on carbon lock-in attempted to explain
why industrialized countries had failed to take meaningful action to
address climate change, despite the scientific evidence regarding the
threats of climate change and other harms caused by climate change.137
Professor Unruh argued that “carbon lock-in arises from systemic
interactions among technologies and institutions” through which
technological systems and private and public institutions co-evolve to
create path-dependent reliance on maintaining or extending the status
quo.138 Carbon lock-in thus has two essential subparts: technological lockin and institutional lock-in.
Technological lock-in begins when a design (such as the internal
combustion engine) defeats a slate of competitors, often destroying the
competing designs in the process.139 Once elevated as the chosen
technology, mass production or development of the technology can
quickly drive down costs and enable the technology to achieve economies
of scale, thereby locking in that technology as the dominant design.140
Once a design becomes dominant, a broader technological system—
extending from steel, glass, and rubber manufacturing, to roads, gas
stations, and drive-through restaurants—develops into a broad network
that becomes dependent upon that dominant design.141
This
interdependence tends to suppress innovation, as incumbent firms are
unlikely to develop new technologies that could render the dominant
137. Unruh, supra note 12, at 817.
138. Id. at 818.
139. Id. at 820–21. At the beginning of the twentieth century, gasoline-powered internal
combustion engines, steam-power vehicles, and electric vehicles competed with each other to replace
the horse and buggy. Although the internal combustion engine was considered the worst of the three,
it ultimately became the dominant design due to the very low cost of gasoline and various chance
events. Id. at 821.
140. Id. at 821 (explaining how mass production of the automobiles with internal combustion
engines and expansive development of alternating current transmission lines locked in those
technologies as the dominant designs).
141. Id. at 822.
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design obsolete and financial institutions are unlikely to invest in risky
new technologies when the system as a whole is developed around the
dominant design.142 Technological lock-in thus results from the creation
of a broader technological system that perpetuates and expands reliance
on the dominant design.
Institutional lock-in exacerbates technological lock-in. Both private
and public institutions play a role in institutional lock-in. On the private
side, the development of a dominant design creates social norms and
economic reliance that promote inertia.143 Unions, industry associations,
and consumers become reliant upon the dominant design for jobs and
resources.144 The dominant design can also affect social and behavioral
norms,145 such as the common practice of driving, rather than walking or
cycling, to school, work, or shops. Social institutions increasingly adapt
themselves to using the dominant design, reinforcing the path
dependencies created through technological lock-in.146 So do public
institutions, including those that may be established to regulate the firms
that profit from the dominant design. Government investment in
infrastructure may create the preconditions to enable a design to remain
dominant.147 Government regulators are also often risk-averse and biased
towards the status quo, which makes them more likely to support
investment and technological changes that perpetuate the path
dependencies created by the technological lock-in, rather than to support
abrupt transformations.148
Finally, and significantly, government
institutions tend to support actions that will perpetuate the government
institutions; if innovation threatens an agency’s raison d’être, that agency
may prefer regulatory actions that maintain the status quo.149
Combined, technological lock-in and institutional lock-in create a
synergistic system full of positive feedback mechanisms that have enabled
and expanded carbon lock-in. For each new investment a firm may make
in fossil fuel technologies, whole technological systems may develop to
supply resources to or benefit from the new technology. Government

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 822–23.
Id. at 823–24.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825.
See id.
Id. at 824–25.
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agencies often reinforce the fossil fuel technologies by developing
infrastructure to enable their use, failing to regulate externalities caused
by the fossil fuel technologies, or directly authorizing the construction of
the new technologies. Once the government sanctions the use of the
technologies, this may promote increased development and reliance on the
technologies. As this reliance increases, the government may hesitate to
regulate the technology, even if it proves to be unnecessary or harmful.
These technological-institutional interactions perpetuate the problem of
carbon lock-in.
2. The Types and Causes of Carbon Lock-In
In the years since Professor Unruh published his first article on carbon
lock-in, a number of scholars have published several other papers that
expand upon the idea, by categorizing the types and causes of carbon lockin,150 assessing its global extent,151 and identifying potential ways to break
the lock-in.152 A deeper exploration of some of this literature helps
illustrate why natural gas is particularly prone to lock-in in the United
States.
a. Infrastructure and Technology Lock-In
As Professor Unruh initially explained, carbon lock-in begins with the
physical infrastructure and technologies that produce and supply energy.
Once built, most energy infrastructure will remain in use for several
decades.153 Energy infrastructure tends to be expensive, difficult, and
time-consuming to build, and it can take years of operation before the sunk
costs of building capital-intensive assets are recovered. 154 Owners of the
infrastructure are loathe to retire or replace it prematurely and risk
stranding their assets or profits.155 Indeed, it is far more likely for energy
infrastructure to last longer than its estimated useful lifespan.156
150. Seto et al., supra note 12.
151. See Erickson et al., supra note 12.
152. See Lehmann et al., supra note 12.
153. Seto et al., supra note 12, at 430 fig. 2 (showing thirty-year estimated lifespan for gas power
and forty- to fifty-year lifespan for coal power).
154. Id. at 427–28, fig 1.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 429; see also Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1030 (discussing coal plants
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Primary energy infrastructure (such as production wells and power
plants) creates additional direct and indirect path dependencies as other
infrastructure is developed to use the energy supplies. Houses, buildings,
transportation systems, industrial manufacturers, and whole communities
might be built in response to the development of a new power plant.157
Once constructed, the built environment’s energy demand may persist for
centuries158 and thus may lock-in existing energy supply infrastructure for
decades, if not longer.159 For example, if a new housing development is
constructed with gas lines in place to provide home heating, it may be
expensive and disruptive to replace the gas infrastructure with district
heating pipes.160 As the footprint of the housing development grows, it is
likely that additional homes will use the same fuel that was incorporated
into the original design. In addition, primary energy infrastructure often
induces development of new fossil-fuel supporting infrastructure, such as
pipelines and processing plants,161 and the specificity of the supporting
infrastructure (i.e., gas pipelines deliver natural gas, while oil pipelines
and rail cars deliver oil) tends to ensure that as primary energy
infrastructure is retired, its replacements will continue to use the same type
of fuel.162 In other words, without significant regulatory, economic, and
informational interventions, gas plants tend to replace gas plants, and gas
furnaces tend to replace gas furnaces.
b. Institutional Lock-In
Both public and private institutions reinforce infrastructure and
technology lock-in. When institutions make decisions or take actions to
support the dominant design, they often shape future events by closing off

staying online past their anticipated useful lives).
157. Seto et al., supra note 12, at 427–28.
158. Id. at 431–32 (discussing long-lived nature of buildings, transportation infrastructure, and
cities).
159. Id. at 427–28.
160. See Stein, supra note 36, at 583–84 (explaining how “hard” infrastructure, such as oil and
gas infrastructure, is likely to remain in place). District heating systems provide thermal energy for
“space-heating, space-cooling, or water-heating” purposes, typically in dense and semi-dense urban
environments. Adam L. Reed & John S. McCartney, The Sun Also Rises: Prospects for Solar District
Heating in the United States, 25 ALB. L.J. OF SCI. & TECH. 165, 166–67 (2015).
161. Seto et al., supra note 12, at 427–28.
162. See id.
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alternative designs.163 Indeed, Professor Karen Seto and her co-authors
argue that whereas technological lock-in results unintentionally due to
initial design successes and the development of supporting infrastructure,
institutional lock-in is intentional.164 Institutional lock-in results from
“conscious efforts by powerful economic, social, and political actors” to
ensure a technology’s dominance.165 Private actors, including the energy
industry, trade unions, investors, land owners who earn rent from leasing
property to energy producers, and resource consumers frequently join
together to lobby public institutions to promote or protect the locked-in
structure.166 These political forces may in fact be superior to market forces
in creating sustained lock-in.167
Once public institutions create regulatory and structural norms that
support the dominant technologies, they are unlikely to quickly reverse
course. Politicians are biased in favor of the status quo and retaining their
own political power, which makes them susceptible to political pressure
from incumbents.168 Unelected bureaucrats are similarly biased in favor
of the status quo, whether because they fear political pressure or because
they believe that regulatory certainty and political stability are benefits in
and of themselves.169 Ultimately, these private and public institutions
create institutional feedback loops that further entrench the existing energy
system.170
Indeed, these institutional feedback loops may be strong enough to
suppress efforts that could break technology lock-in. Lock-ins tend to be
broken either by a sudden shock that enables new institutional actions to
exert political force, through sustained and intentional pressure that
ultimately produces enough small policy changes to enable broader
transformation, or through a combination of disruptive shocks and

163. Id. at 433.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 433–34; see also Unruh, supra note 12, at 825.
167. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 433–34; see also Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12, at 3
(noting the objections to simplistic arguments that technological lock-in is predetermined once earlymoving technology is adopted and describing the importance of sustained political support to ensure
lock-in).
168. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 434.
169. See id. (discussing institutional bureaucrats and their motivations to keep the current system
in place).
170. Id.
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sustained political pressure.171 However, institutional lock-in can cut off
these avenues to change if, for example, national institutions tamp down
state and local efforts to adjust the status quo.172 While disruptive forces
can still break open institutional lock-in, the institutional resistance to
change is particularly potent.
c. Behavioral and Discursive Lock-In
This institutional resistance is reinforced by behavioral and discursive
lock-in dynamics. Behavioral lock-in refers to the tendency of humans to
engage in habitual actions that enable the status quo.173 Discursive lockin refers to the narratives that establish, justify, and promote the behavioral
lock-in.174 Typically, behaviors are considered particularly sticky because
they do not require narratives to persist: once a behavior has become a
habit, individuals will persist in the habit unthinkingly.175 So, a person
who typically drives to work will continue driving to work even as traffic
worsens, cycling lanes are built, and it becomes easier and quicker to bike
rather than drive. But most behaviors are preceded by initial conscious
decision-making—whether to buy a car at all or where to live—and can
be influenced by discourse.176 If public discourse promotes cycling over
driving, and frames that choice as moral, socially responsible, and
meaningful, that messaging may influence individual decision-making. If
the person buys a bike rather than a car, that will tend to lock-in the habit
of cycling rather than driving.
Both behavioral and discursive lock-in apply on a societal level as
well. Public discourse creates social licenses and social norms.177 Public
discourse may encourage behaviors like recycling and energy
conservation, but it may also be used to justify wasteful decisions. Public
discourse can also result in highly sticky messages that are difficult to
reverse even when the underlying facts or politics change.
Skepticism regarding climate science illustrates these phenomena.
171. Id. at 434–35.
172. Id. at 434.
173. See id. at 438–41.
174. Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12, at 3–4.
175. Seto et al., supra note 12, at 438–41.
176. Id. at 438; Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12, at 3–4.
177. Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12, at 3–4 (noting, among other things, the process by which
a particular frame or discourse can achieve widespread acceptance).
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a broad political consensus had formed
that climate change was real and caused predominantly by humans burning
fossil fuels.178 In the 2000s, however, fossil fuel interests and some
politicians ramped up a public messaging campaign to spread doubt about
the legitimacy of climate science.179 Even as the evidence mounted to
support climate science, and even as the scientific consensus regarding
climate change intensified, many people continued to express skepticism
regarding climate change because the public discourse remained focused
on the debate.180 These debates, of course, affected the adoption of climate
policies. Climate change became a partisan issue.181 President Donald
Trump famously declared that climate change was a “hoax,”182 and his
administration spent four years repealing the climate policies and
regulations that had been enacted by the Obama Administration.183 This
denialism also created social license for members of the public to ignore
climate change in their purchasing decisions and individual actions. For
example, in an effort to demonstrate their allegiance to coal (and thus to
President Trump’s pro-coal positions), a number of diesel truck owners
disabled pollution control equipment to be able to convert their vehicles
into hyper-polluting, “coal roller[]” trucks.184 Thus, as the discourse
locked in skepticism of climate change, it also promoted behavioral lockin and technological lock-in by those who responded to the discourse by
flouting environmental rules.
Discourse and behaviors are, like other aspects of carbon lock-in,
178. Scott H. Segal, Be Cool! Staying Open Minded About Climate Policy Development, 18
DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 307, 308–10 (2008).
179. Sarah Childress, Timeline: The Politics of Climate Change, PBS (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-the-politics-of-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/9PUZ-MFA6].
180. Id.
181. Nadja Popovich, Climate Change Rises as a Public Priority. But it’s More Partisan Than
Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/20/climate/climatechange-polls.html [https://perma.cc/2FEJ-H9S5].
182. Helier Cheung, What Does Trump Actually Believe on Climate Change?, BBC (Jan. 23,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51213003 [https://perma.cc/V3Z2-WAPM]
(“[Trump] has called climate change ‘mythical,’ ‘nonexistent,’ or ‘an expensive hoax’ . . . .”).
183. Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump Administration
Rolled Back More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4BN-JCHN].
184. Richard Maxwell & Toby Miller, Trump Coal Rolls the World, PSYCH. TODAY (June 5,
2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/greening-the-media/201706/trump-coal-rolls-theworld [https://perma.cc/L5HZ-LERX].
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mutually reinforcing. People create narratives to justify their behaviors,
and they engage in behaviors in response to the public discourse.185
Discourse may play a particularly important role, however, in affecting the
initial behaviors that promote habits (i.e., behavioral lock-in).186
Discourse may also strongly influence the direction and extent of
institutional lock-in.187 Discursive lock-in therefore appears to be a
meaningful contributor to carbon lock-in, but more assessment and
analysis are necessary to understand its impact.
d. Legal Lock-In
Finally, legal regimes play a significant role in contributing to carbon
lock-in. While legal systems are often embedded in discussions of
institutional lock-in,188 they deserve separate discussion and treatment
because many legal regimes predate or exist outside of the institutional
frameworks that purposefully create carbon lock-in. Three such legal
systems that tend to affect carbon lock-in are utility regulation, the
environmental laws that overtly protect incumbents, and the constitutional
prohibition against uncompensated takings. Many more examples
certainly exist, but these three examples illustrate the important role of law
in perpetuating lock-in.
i.

Utility Regulation

The legal regimes that apply to both electric and gas utilities include
numerous mechanisms that exacerbate carbon lock-in. As Professor Amy
Stein has described, electricity regulation is in many ways specifically
tailored to create path dependencies.189 The regulation of gas utilities
mirrors electricity regulation in several critical aspects that tend towards
lock-in.190

185. See footnotes 173–77 and accompanying text.
186. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 438–39 (noting that habits begin as conscious decisions and
noting the effect of “cultural values and beliefs” and “psychological barriers” on taking actions related
to climate change).
187. Buschmann & Oels, supra note 12, at 5.
188. See Unruh, supra note 12, at 823–25.
189. See Stein, supra note 36, at 568–70.
190. See id. at 564–69, 571–80 (exploring the characteristics of path dependence as well as the
application of institutional logic in the context of electricity regulation).
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Since its inception, utility regulation has focused on protecting
incumbent monopolies from competition that could otherwise lead to
innovative change.191 Grounded in the belief that the electricity and gas
systems were natural monopolies incapable of sustaining efficient
competition, utility regulation developed to sanction monopoly franchises
while protecting utilities’ customers from monopolistic behaviors, such as
the monopolistic instinct to provide poor service at high prices.192 Utility
regulation curtails these outcomes through the duty to serve and rate
regulation.193 At the same time, these two components of utility regulation
create the strongest tendencies towards lock-in.
The duty to serve requires each regulated utility to provide universal,
non-discriminatory service to all customers within the utility’s service
territory.194 It also imposes a reciprocal duty on those customers to be
served.195 By its very nature, the duty to serve creates a lock-in structure.
With some important exceptions, customers within a utility’s service
territory are generally constrained from obtaining the same type of service
from a non-incumbent utility provider.196 The exceptions, moreover, are
often structured in ways that make it difficult for new market entrants and
technologies to gain a sufficient foothold that can overcome the power of
the incumbent monopolies. For example, many states prohibit nonincumbents from offering competitive service within an existing utility’s
service territory.197 Even where competition is legally permitted,
customers must often pay a substantial exit fee to sever existing
relationships with the incumbent utility.198 New utility providers,
191. Id. at 569–71; William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV.
1614, 1639 (2014).
192. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age
of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1288–1319 (1998); Troy
A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 138–39
(2015) (describing how the duty to serve became a tool to prevent competition).
193. Rossi, supra note 192, at 1261, 1286.
194. Rule, supra note 192, at 138–39, 139 n.93.
195. Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENV’T L. 105, 131 (2016).
196. See id.
197. See Jonas J. Monast, Electricity Competition and the Public Good: Rethinking Markets and
Monopolies, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 674 (2019); Boyd, supra note 191, at 1792–93 (describing the
movement away from competition).
198. See Monast, supra note 197, at 702–05 (discussing exit fees in Nevada); see generally Steven
Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally Sculpt the Deregulating Electric
Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2002) (discussing exit fees during electricity
restructuring).
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including those operated by municipalities and rural cooperatives, may
also be required to buy out part of an incumbent utility’s franchise.199 The
costs of competition are often so high that few even bother to try to become
would-be competitors.
The underlying duty to serve is designed to protect both utilities and
customers from price shocks and disruption that could result if a
significant portion of a utility’s customer base departs from the utility.200
Because so many utility investments are capital-intensive, long-lived, and
designed to be paid off over decades, utilities face substantial stranded cost
risks.201 And, because so many utility customers depend on utilities for
essential services like electricity, water, and heat, regulators try to
minimize stranded cost risks by constraining competition.202 Utility
regulation is therefore designed to maintain the status quo for as long as
possible, even if it merely delays the inevitable departure of customers and
movement towards competition.203
Rate regulation further entrenches the bias in favor of the status quo.204
199. See Outka, supra note 195, at 132; see also Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 659 (stating
“regulators routinely found ways to help mitigate the stranded cost impacts on firms and investors of
the regulatory transition to competitive markets”).
200. See Rossi, supra note 192, at 1289–90; see also Letter from Ari Peskoe, Senior Fellow in
Electricity Law, Harvard Env’t Pol’y Initiative, to Quadrennial Energy Review Task Force, Office of
Energy Pol’y & Sys. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Harvard-Environmental-Policy-Initiative-QER-Comment-There-Is-No-RegulatoryCompact.pdf [https://perma.cc/K46Q-C88D] (contesting the existence of a regulatory compact and
asserting it is primarily designed to constrain competition); Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v.
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 225 F.3d 667, 699–701 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
201. See Letter from Ari Peskoe, supra note 200; Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp., 225
F.3d at 698–701.
202. See Letter from Ari Peskoe, supra note 200; Stein, supra note 36, at 575–80. Most early
models of electric system competition aimed to allow larger users, such as industrial, commercial, and
municipal users, to choose their electric providers. Boyd, supra note 191, at 1792–93 (describing the
movement away from competition). If utilities made investments in power plants and other assets
based on the expectation of providing continued service to these larger entities, there was a risk that
competition would result in these assets becoming stranded or in the remaining customers—many of
whom were less wealthy residential customers—paying increased rates to cover the utilities’ stranded
costs. More recent policies allow end users to install their own solar panels and renewable energy
systems, but typically favor those end users who can afford to invest in those systems. See Rule, supra
note 192. These policies thus enable the departure of customers who are typically better off financially
and who may be subsidizing other consumers through progressive utility rates. Id.; see also Monast,
supra note 197, at 704–05.
203. See Stein, supra note 36, at 575–80; Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp., 225 F.3d at
698–702 (upholding transition fees that would delay departure of wholesale customers as utilities
unbundled).
204. See Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of
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The dual purposes of rate regulation are to protect ratepayers from
monopolistic pricing while ensuring utilities earn sufficient revenues to
maintain their financial integrity and attract investments.205 Typically,
utilities use a formula to set the rates utilities may charge.206 This formula
entitles utilities to earn a rate of return on their capital expenditures and to
recover their full operating expenses.207 Investments in physical assets,
like in power plants or pipelines, will typically be recovered over the
estimated economic lifespans of those assets, so it can take decades for a
regulated utility to be fully compensated for those investments.208 Thus,
rate regulation establishes many of the conditions that contribute to carbon
lock-in, including high capital expenditures, substantial sunk costs, and
slow payback periods.209
In addition, many states prohibit utilities from recovering their full
sunk costs in assets unless those assets were “used and useful.”210 States
approach the used and useful requirements in various ways. Some states
prohibit utilities from passing any costs onto ratepayers after an asset is no
longer used or useful.211 Other states allow utilities to recover any
remaining expenses associated with building now-unusable plants, but
they deny utilities the right to earn a rate of return on those stranded
assets.212 Yet other states allow full recovery (including the rate of return)
on all assets—whether or not they are used-and-useful—and often despite
significant opposition from ratepayers.213 Regardless of the approach
regulators use, the consequences of either denying or allowing recovery
are often unpleasant enough that regulators and utilities try to avoid them
by allowing undepreciated assets to remain in operation.214 Yet again,
‘Cheap’ Electricity, 12 U. PA. J. OF BUS. L. 407, 413–14 (2010); Emily Hammonde & David B.
Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 149–51 (2016).
205. See Powers, supra note 204, at 413–14; Outka, supra note 195, at 131; Rossi, supra note
192, at 1268–69.
206. Powers, supra note 204, at 413–14; see also Richard J. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of
Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 542–43 (1984).
207. Powers, supra note 204, at 413–14.
208. Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 683; Rossi, supra note 192, at 1270 (noting the longterm nature of these contracts).
209. Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 683.
210. Powers, supra note 204, at 418–19; Pierce, supra note 206, at 512–17.
211. Powers, supra note 204, at 418–19; Pierce, supra note 206, at 514–17 (discussing the various
approaches taken by different courts in passing on costs to customers).
212. Pierce, supra note 206, at 516–17.
213. Id. at 518, 542.
214. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 645–47 (noting “the industry’s immobile capital
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such regulatory practices enable lock-in.
Finally, even for assets that are not owned by regulated utilities,
federal rules regarding energy contracts may extend lock-in. Under a
principle known as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine,215 there is a strong
presumption against regulatory interference with both gas and electricity
contracts.216 So, if a retail electric utility has entered into long-term power
purchase agreements (PPAs) with natural gas power generators, that utility
cannot ask regulators to override the terms of the contract. If a utility
wants to renegotiate the PPAs to shorten the contract length, the generators
will have substantial bargaining power to demand a high payout in
exchange. Depending upon the willingness of the generator to renegotiate
the PPA, energy contracts facilitate lock-in.217
These illustrations provide just a few examples of how utility
regulation creates path dependencies and reinforces carbon lock-in. There
are many more examples in electricity regulation alone.218 Suffice it to
say, the legal regime is a potent force in amplifying lock-in.
ii. Grandfathering
Grandfathering from environmental regulation is a second wellrecognized legal driver of carbon lock-in.219 Although a number of
environmental laws protect incumbents, the Clean Air Act is arguably the
most notorious grandfathering statute.220 The main stationary source
programs221 that potentially apply to greenhouse gases either regulate only
assets with” lifespans of up to eighty years and noting “that past approaches to stranded cost recovery
could just as easily thwart as facilitate decarbonization”).
215. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine was established by two cases: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956) and Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350
U.S. 348 (1956). See also Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527
(2008) (affirming continued relevance of the Mobile-Sierra presumption); Stephen L. Teichler & Ilia
L. Levitine, Long-Term Power Purchase Agreements in a Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2005).
216. Teichler & Levitine, supra note 215, at 682–83.
217. Indeed, lock-in is the very purpose of long-term PPAs. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at
547.
218. See Stein, supra note 36; Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36; Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra
note 36.
219. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1022–24.
220. See id. at 1030; RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER
PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” 49–52, 54 (2016).
221. Stationary sources in the gas sector include power plants, gas processing plants, and gas
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new or modified sources222 or impose specific prerequisites prior to
regulating existing sources.223 The exemption of existing sources from
regulation has tended to extend the lifespan of existing fossil fuel assets.224
Existing source exemptions may also incentivize a rush to build new
fossil-fuel facilities if it appears that regulators may establish new or more
stringent emissions standards. So long as exposure to regulations depends
on when a facility began construction or became operational,
grandfathering will incentivize a race to build before the regulations
become effective. And, once the facility is grandfathered, the economic
advantages gained from the regulatory exemptions will tend to lead to
continued emissions lock-in.
iii. Takings Law
Finally, the constitutional prohibition against uncompensated
takings225 likely acts as another powerful barrier to innovation that
reinforces carbon lock-in.226 Whenever government actors seek to use law
or regulation to phase out or transition away from an existing resource
type, they face the likely prospect that the incumbent owners of the
existing resources will sue, alleging the government’s action amounts to
an unlawful taking.227 While Professors Christopher Serkin and Michael
Vandenbergh question whether such lawsuits could succeed,228 they
nonetheless convincingly argue that “the perceived threat of takings

pipeline and production infrastructure. See, e.g., Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emissions Standards for
New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824 (June 3, 2016) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3); Stationary Sources of Air Pollution, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution [https://perma.cc/ZRH5-SENQ] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2021) (providing a host of links to other sources); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz,
Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1682–83 (2007).
222. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 220, at 30, Nash & Revesz, supra note 221, at 1681–83.
223. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (establishing regulatory prerequisites and conditions before
existing stationary sources are regulated).
224. REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 220, at 33, 54; Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at
1030.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
226. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1020, 1022–23.
227. Id. at 1036–37.
228. Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3854992

NATURAL GAS LOCK IN MELISSA POWERS DRAFT 5.28.21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

136

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

5/27/21 9:30 AM

[Vol. XX

claims may be the greatest impediment to regulatory change.”229 A
“skittish and politically responsive government”230 which is already
inclined toward the status quo231 might use the uncertainty surrounding
potential takings claims to avoid actions that could accelerate a phase out
of gas and facilitate a quicker transition towards clean electrification.232
All of the contributors to carbon lock-in are mutually reinforcing.
Technology lock-in occurs in part due to the legal regimes and public
discourses that enable technological systems to develop.233 Legal regimes
both result from and solidify institutional lock-in.234 The institutions fear
backlash that could result from forcing behavioral changes, and they often
create and endorse narratives that enable behavioral, and thus
technological, lock-in.235 And so it goes, in a series of positive feedback
loops.236 While it is possible to cut off the feedback loops and break lockin, it is also very challenging. This is particularly true when it comes to
natural gas.
B. The Pervasive Nature of Gas Lock-In
The factors that tend to create fossil-fuel lock-in apply with particular
force to the natural gas sector. First, due to the expansive nature of natural
gas infrastructure, the fact that much of it is capital-intensive and designed
to last for decades, and the diverse set of owners of the infrastructure, this
article argues that natural gas is highly susceptible to infrastructure and
technological lock-in in the United States.237 Second, the multi-scalar
nature of gas infrastructure amplifies institutional and legal lock-in.238
Third, the fact that gas infrastructure is purchased and used by a wide
variety of consumers, including individuals, also makes gas particularly
susceptible to behavioral lock-in, which is perpetuated by the discourse
229. Id. at 1036.
230. Id. at 1047.
231. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 434.
232. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1047 (“[T]here are nontrivial reasons to worry that
the development of natural gas infrastructure today may well lock in those investments and make
subsequent regulation more difficult, more expensive, and potentially even impermissible.”).
233. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 438.
234. See id. at 442 fig. 3.
235. See id. at 434, 438–41.
236. See id. at 440.
237. See id. at 431–32.
238. See id. at 427, 431–34 (discussing reinforcing effects of institutional lock-in).
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depicting gas as a clean energy source and bridge fuel.239 Collectively,
these drivers of lock-in are mutually reinforcing and thus make natural gas
lock-in a particularly strong barrier to rapid energy-sector
decarbonization.
1. Gas Infrastructure Lock-in
The multi-sector expanse of natural gas infrastructure, combined with
its capital costs, long expected lifespan, and diverse ownership, creates a
significant risk of sustained gas lock-in. Natural gas infrastructure
expands from production wells through gathering pipelines to gas
processing plants; through additional pipelines and storage facilities to
export terminals, industrial facilities, and power plants; and through
distribution pipelines to residential and commercial end users.240 Many
end users of natural gas—which include power plants and industrial
boilers that burn gas to produce electricity,241 chemical plants that use gas
to produce plastics,242 and residential and commercial owners of gas
furnaces, water heaters, and stoves243—have invested in their own
equipment and infrastructure to consume the gas, and this infrastructure is
physically and economically interdependent with the upstream gas
infrastructure. As a result, the features of technology lock-in are more
pronounced with natural gas than other fossil fuels. First, the gas system
has several types of facilities that are capital-intensive, as well as
expansive emissions-supporting infrastructure and energy-demanding
infrastructure, all of which reinforce technology lock-in.244 Second, in
comparison to other fossil fuels including coal and nuclear, natural gas
serves a much more diverse set of users, including the electricity
239. See id. at 433–35, 438 (discussing reinforcing effects of behavioral lock-in); Kalen, supra
note 36, at 321–22.
240. See Sara Gosman, Planning for Failure: Pipelines, Risk, and the Energy Revolution, 81
OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 356–58 (2020).
241. See Office of Fossil Energy, How Gas Turbine Power Plants Work, ENERGY.GOV,
https://www.energy.gov/fe/how-gas-turbine-power-plants-work
[https://perma.cc/2KFV-3MGZ]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
242. See How Much Oil is Used to Make Plastic?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 17, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=34&t=6 [https://perma.cc/6WQU-7GGY].
243. See U.S. Energy Facts, EIA, supra note 15 (depicting a graphic which shows that natural
gas provided thirty-six percent of electricity fuels, forty percent of industrial fuels, forty-four percent
of residential fuel, thirty-nine percent of commercial fuel, and three percent of transportation fuels).
244. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 429, 431–32.
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generators, direct industrial and commercial users, residential users, and
even the transportation system.245 The pervasive and varied nature of gas
ownership enables technology lock-in at all levels of the gas system.
To begin, multiple parts of the broader gas system include large,
capital-intensive facilities—such as gas wells, transportation pipelines,
gas-fired power plants, chemical plants, and export terminals—that can be
difficult to develop and time-consuming to build.246 Their owners will
have sunk substantial costs into the assets, which they intend to recover
over their estimated useful lives—which often span several decades, if not
longer.247 Consistent with the underlying causes of carbon lock-in, these
dynamics promote natural gas lock-in.248
Indeed, gas production may be particularly subject to technological
lock-in due to the capital-intensive nature of unconventional gas
production, the number of gas developers, and the financing structures
common in the industry.249 Many developers borrow money from banks,
hedge funds, and other investors to finance their drilling operations.250 The
developers require quick and sustained revenues from productive wells to
pay off their loans.251 For a cash-dependent, capital-intensive industry,
high initial flow rates may be critical for economic survival.252 Yet, initial
production rates are highly variable from well to well and gas formation
to gas formation.253 Production rates at unconventional gas wells also tend
to fall off substantially and relatively quickly after the initial flow.254 If a
245. U.S. Energy Facts, EIA, supra note 15.
246. While the average costs of drilling each well are subject to some debate and uncertainty, the
Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that per-well capital costs ranged from $4.9
million to $8.3 million in the period from 2006 to 2015. See U.S. ENERGY I NFO. ADMIN., TRENDS IN
U.S.
OIL
AND
NATURAL
GAS
UPSTREAM
COSTS
1–2
(2016),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/pdf/upstream.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P6C-AVJN]; see
also Seto et al., supra note 12, at 427–28 (describing features of infrastructure lock-in).
247. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 428 fig. 1, 431–32 (describing the role of sunk costs in
infrastructure lock-in).
248. See id. at 425–28; see also Unruh, supra note 12, at 821–23; Kalen, supra note 36, at 362
(discussing pipeline infrastructure); Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1030–31 (discussing
powerplants); Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 685–86 (discussing large-scale infrastructure).
249. See Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 1342–43.
250. See MCLEAN, supra note 32, at 12, 20, 45–46.
251. See Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 1343.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1342–43.
254. See id. at 1343–44; see also J. DAVID HUGHES, DRILLING DEEPER: A REALITY CHECK ON
U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS FOR A LASTING TIGHT OIL & SHALE GAS BOOM 11 (2014),
http://www.postcarbon.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Drilling-Deeper_FULL.pdf
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fracked well produces little gas initially and small but steady amounts of
gas over time—as is often the case—the long-term returns may never
make up the initial capital invested in the well.255 For almost a decade,
some investors have warned that the developers and investors are on a
natural gas “treadmill” of investment and debt. 256 Specifically, to earn
revenues to pay off existing debt, natural gas companies must continually
drill new wells and incur the significant upfront costs associated with
drilling.257 The natural gas industry may be in an endless cycle in which
it must drill more and more new wells simply to lose ground at a slower
rate.258 If so, it represents a classic case of technological lock-in of a
subpar uneconomical resource.259
The natural gas sector features other critical elements of technological
lock-in, including a substantial amount of emissions-supporting
infrastructure,260 such as gathering lines, processing plants, transmission
lines, and distribution lines.261 A fair amount of this infrastructure is
specific to the gas sector,262 and much of the gas infrastructure is
intentionally overbuilt to provide transportation and processing services to
other gas users.263 Asset specificity and overcapacity are hallmarks of
[https://perma.cc/C6UN-JGQG] (noting that production levels decline by seventy-four percent to
eighty-two percent over a three-year period, depending upon the shale formation at issue).
255. See Fitzgerald, supra note 61, at 1342–44; HUGHES, supra note 254, at 11–12; Production
and Royalty Declines in a Natural Gas Well Over Time, GEOLOGY.COM,
https://geology.com/royalty/production-decline.shtml [https://perma.cc/2M3J-L6NQ] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2020).
256. See HUGHES, supra note 254, at 16, 25, 62.
257. See id. at 6, 13, 25, 56, 62; Production and Royalty Declines, supra note 255; Fitzgerald,
supra note 61, at 1342–43.
258. Questions about the industry’s viability emerged years ago, when the New York Times
reported that internal Energy Information Administration documents showed that many agency
analysts believed that much of the hype regarding the natural gas boom was based on irrational
exuberance. Specifically, one EIA document suggested that “companies have exaggerated ‘the
appearance of shale gas well profitability,’ are highlighting the performance of only their best wells
and may be using overly optimistic models for projecting the wells’ productivity over the next several
decades.” Ian Urbina, Drilling Down Behind Veneer, Doubt on Future of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES
(June
26,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/us/27gas.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/9JUP-5ZLG].
259. See Unruh, supra note 12, at 818, 822.
260. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 431.
261. See id. at 428 (explaining how attendant infrastructure contributes to lock-in).
262. See id. (explaining how asset specificity contributes to lock-in).
263. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 364–66 (demonstrating FERC’s preference to allow potential
over-building to accommodate future users, rather than “explore market need more meaningfully”);
Baker et al., supra note 53 (discussing the gas industry’s plans to use hydrogen to enable further
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infrastructure lock-in.264
While some of the capital-intensive
infrastructure, such as electric transmission lines, is not designed
specifically for gas power, it is often not feasible to replace an existing gas
power plant with a renewable or other non-gas resource on the same site.265
The transmission infrastructure associated with the gas plants may
therefore become stranded if the gas plant is retired. Accordingly,
consistent with the features that tend to create infrastructure and
technological lock-in, the development of large capital-intensive facilities
that depend on asset-specific supporting infrastructure solidifies the gas
lock-in.
At the consumer level, another extension of gas infrastructure directly
supplies consumers with natural gas for their stoves, furnaces, and water
heaters. State-regulated natural gas distribution utilities build distribution
lines to pipe gas into homes, businesses, schools, hospitals, and other
buildings.266 Depending upon the distribution line infrastructure and
building design, replacing gas with other options could be cumbersome
and expensive, particularly in urban environments where infrastructure
replacement may require road closures and other disruptions.267 In
addition, if buildings (which may be very long-lived) were designed
without sufficient insulation or orientation, this can induce expansive
development of natural gas heating systems to offset the consequences of
poor design.268 Residential buildings often feature their own lock-in
dynamics due to individual use of gas stoves, furnaces, water heaters, and
other appliances.269 While each appliance may seem to have a much
growth); see also CATHY KUNKEL & TOM SANZILLO, RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE EXPANSION IN APPALACHIA: PROPOSED ATLANTIC COAST AND MOUNTAIN VALLEY
PIPELINES NEED GREATER SCRUTINY 1, 4–9 (2016).
264. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 428 (discussing asset specificity); Vivek Bansal & Anshu
Mittal, Midstream: Charting a New Course Amid Market Dynamism, DELOITTE (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/oil-and-gas/decoding-oil-gasdownturn/midstream-pipeline-infrastructure-transportation.html
[https://perma.cc/98A4-3R87]
(discussing overcapacity).
265. See Alexandra B. Klass, Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid to
Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS AND ANALYSIS 10749, 10751–53 (2017).
266. See Gosman, supra note 240, at 356–60.
267. See id.; see also Restore and Improve Urban Infrastructure, NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G,
http://www.engineeringchallenges.org/challenges/infrastructure.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9YYVRKPS] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (describing, in brief, a few challenges in urban infrastructure
upkeep).
268. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 432–33.
269. Id. at 430, fig. 2.
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shorter lifespan and cost when compared to a power plant or other utilityscale equipment,270 that comparison is incomplete because costs are
relative. The relevant question is whether natural gas appliances are
considered long-lived and expensive to their owners, and the answer is
usually yes.271 Accordingly, like the owners of power plants or pipelines,
appliance owners will tend to use their own gas equipment throughout and
past their useful lives.272 Moreover, when they replace equipment,
building owners may not replace all appliances simultaneously.273
Piecemeal replacements are likely to lead to continued use of natural gas
appliances, particularly if the physical layout of the building more easily
accommodates like-for-like replacements.274 Similarly, if replacing a
natural gas appliance with an electric one requires the services of multiple
tradespeople or utilities, homeowners may choose the path of least
resistance and continue using gas.275 In short, homeowners will follow the
same path dependency dynamics that lead to broader infrastructure lockin.276 And, because there are so many owners of natural gas equipment at
so many levels of the natural gas system, infrastructure lock-in is pervasive
and self-reinforcing.
Collectively, the multi-scalar nature of gas infrastructure, the extent of
interdependent and often gas-specific supporting infrastructure, and the
fact that gas infrastructure is difficult to develop, long-lived, and
expensive from the owner’s perspective, create the lock-in conditions that
apply at multiple levels and are mutually reinforcing. In comparison to
other fossil fuels, natural gas lock-in appears particularly strong. Neither
coal nor oil is as pervasive as gas. Coal is used almost exclusively for

270. Id.
271. See Heather Payne, Pulling in Both Directions: How States are Moving Toward
Decarbonization While Continuing to Support Fossil Fuels, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 285, 307–08
(2020).
272. Id. (noting that appliances in homes will take a longer time to phase out).
273. See David Roberts, Most American Homes are Still Heated with Fossil Fuels. It’s Time to
Electrify.,
VOX
(July
2,
2018,
10:17
AM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2018/6/20/17474124/electrification-natural-gas-furnace-heat-pump
[https://perma.cc/7SJX-EDTH].
274. See id. (describing personal challenges replacing a furnace); Payne, supra note 271, at 307–
08; see also Robert Gross & Richard Hanna, Path Dependency in Provision of Domestic Heating, 4
NATURE ENERGY 358 (2019).
275. Payne, supra note 271, at 307–08; see Gross & Hanna, supra note 274.
276. Gross & Hanna, supra note 274.
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electricity production.277 While there are many barriers to quick shifts
away from coal in the electric sector, targeted policies aimed at a relatively
small set of owners appear to have already broken coal lock-in.278 As for
oil, while it has a broad set of producers similar to gas, it has fewer end
uses. Oil is predominately a transportation fuel, but it also plays a
substantial role in the industrial sector.279 But, unlike gas, oil is not
broadly used for electricity production or in end uses.280 Gas is the sole
fossil fuel that broadly spans multiple sectors. As a result, the
infrastructure and technological lock-in challenges are multidimensional
and multi-scalar when it comes to gas.
These physical and ownership dynamics alone help support the thesis
that natural gas lock-in is particularly persistent and pervasive. As
discussed next, the institutional, legal, behavioral, and discursive forces
behind natural gas only strengthen the lock-in.
2. Institutional and Legal Natural Gas Lock-In
The multi-sector expanse of natural gas infrastructure also intensifies
and extends the institutional dynamics that reinforce carbon lock-in.
Numerous private and public institutions are tethered to the gas sector, at
all of its levels, and they have created institutional and legal regimes that
depend upon and help prop up the gas industry.
Gas lock-in, including institutional lock-in, arguably begins at the
well.281 After discovering the resource, gas companies or wildcatters will
secure surface rights to access the gas resource. They will usually
negotiate contracts with landowners that guarantee the drillers access to
the land (as well as easements for ingress and egress) and provide the
landowners with rent and royalties. Gas drillers require substantial
amounts of water and proppants, along with fracking chemicals and

277. U.S. Energy Facts, EIA, supra note 15 (noting that ninety percent of coal is used in the
electric power sector and ten percent is used in industrial boilers).
278. See Gorski, supra note 19.
279. U.S. Energy Facts, EIA, supra note 1243 (noting that seventy percent of oil is used for
transportation, and ninety-one percent of transportation fuels come from petroleum). The other major
use of petroleum (twenty-four percent) is direct industrial use. Id. Very small amounts of petroleum
are used in the commercial, residential, or electric power sectors. Id.
280. Id.
281. See The Basics of Underground Natural Gas Storage, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 16,
2015), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/storage/basics/ [https://perma.cc/QSJ5-RWT7].
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cement, for fracking.282 If their wells produce gas, they will need to send
the gas from the wells along gathering lines to processing plants.283 In
many cases, the wells, gathering lines, and processing plants are located
on properties with several different owners, each of which may be entitled
to rent for use of the land. Once gas has been processed, it will be
transported through (often) interstate pipelines that traverse thousands of
miles over private and public lands.284 The pipelines are owned and
operated by federally regulated gas utilities who deliver gas from
processing plants to hundreds of wholesale and retail users.285 Wholesale
gas buyers include state-regulated gas utilities (called local distribution
companies, or LDCs), who resell the gas to residential and commercial
end-users.286 Some gas consumers, especially in the electricity and
industrial sectors, will buy the gas directly from the pipeline companies.287
There are several other types of gas customers, including gas exporters,
involved in this process as well.
Collectively, there are millions of people with direct relationships to
the gas sector. In the private sector, these include the owners and workers
in the companies that drill for, process, and transport the gas; employees
of the businesses that sell the chemicals, proppants, and cement; property
owners who receive rents and royalties; owners and workers in gasdependent industries; owners and workers of LDCs; and owners of the gasburning equipment.288 These individuals have direct and indirect personal
stakes in the extraction, transportation, and use of gas to provide their
282. Marc Lallanilla, Facts About Fracking, LIVE SCI. (Feb. 10, 2018),
https://www.livescience.com/34464-what-is-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/Z868-4D6K].
283. See Natural Gas Explained: Delivery and Storage of Natural Gas, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/delivery-and-storage.php
[https://perma.cc/Q7U9-JGKF] (last reviewed Jan. 15, 2021).
284. See Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Pipelines, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-pipelines.php [https://perma.cc/ZK2QDQ27] (last updated Dec. 3, 2020).
285. Jacquelyn Pless, Making State Gas Pipelines Safe and Reliable: An Assessment of State
Policy, NCSL (Mar. 2011), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-gas-pipelines-federal-andstate-responsibili.aspx [https://perma.cc/8FML-VSW5].
286. See Natural Gas Explained: Natural Gas Customer Choice Programs, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/customer-choice-programs.php
[https://perma.cc/X757-MQ2S] (last updated Oct. 2, 2020); see also What’s the Difference Between a
Natural Gas Supplier and a Gas Utility?, NAT. GAS PLANS (Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter What’s the
Difference],
https://naturalgasplans.com/difference-between-natural-gas-supplier-and-gas-utility/
[https://perma.cc/V2NC-883J].
287. What’s the Difference, supra note 286.
288. See supra notes 281–87 and accompanying text.
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incomes, returns on investments, and energy supplies. Most of these
individuals are then grouped into private institutions, such as trade
associations, unions, landowner groups, and ratepayer organizations,
which advocate and lobby for continued support of the gas technological
system. While the public sector may seem to have a more objective stance
regarding gas, it, too, includes numerous institutions that helped establish
and continue to reinforce technological lock-in. These institutions
encompass local, state, and sometimes federal land use bodies,289 tax
agencies, building code regulators, environmental regulators, public utility
regulators, and elected officials. Public institutions tend to favor the status
quo. As such, even though public officials may not always have interests
that align with the gas sector, the dynamics of institutional lock-in
reinforce technological lock-in. A few examples illustrate how private and
public institutional dynamics promote lock-in at the gas development,
transportation, electricity generation, and end-use stages.
a. Institutional and Legal Lock-In Associated with Gas Development
Gas lock-in begins with physical development of gas production
infrastructure, which private and public institutions reinforce.290 In the
case of fracking, lock-in arguably began before fracking became
ubiquitous, thanks to federal support and subsidies for horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing, as well as the exemptions from environmental
laws provided under the Energy Policy Act of 2005.291 Institutions also
continue to reinforce lock-in through property law regimes and political
dynamics that enable gas development.
Most gas wells are located on surface property owned by others. Gas
developers will enter into lease agreements with these landowners to drill
for the gas.292 Through these agreements, the developers commit to pay
289. See David B. Spence, Regulation and the New Politics of (Energy) Market Entry, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 327, 339–43 (2019) (discussing facility siting); Heather Payne, Private (Utility)
Regulators, 50 ENV’T L. 999 (2020) (discussing public utility regulation and elected officials);
Jacqueline Yahn, Power and Powerlessness in the Shale Valley Schools: Fracking for Funding, 120
W. VA. L. REV. 943 (2018) (describing the increased reliance on fracking revenues for school
funding).
290. See Unruh, supra note 12.
291. See TREMBATH ET AL., supra note 51, at 26 (discussing federal support for shale fracking);
Wiseman, supra note 50, at 116 (discussing how the Energy Policy Act of 2005 exempted fracking
from the Safe Drinking Water Act); see also supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
292. See Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas Lease and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting to
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monthly or annual rent for use of the land, as well as royalties for any gas
that is produced from the well.293 In the early days of gas development,
unscrupulous developers often took advantage of unsophisticated property
owners, by including lease terms that negated the developers’ obligations
to pay the landowners or by misrepresenting gas production levels in order
to pay smaller royalties than the landowners were owed.294 Eventually,
landowners organized themselves into groups to ensure they received the
proper amounts of rent and royalties.295 While these organizations are
designed to prevent the abuses of developers, the relationships between
landowners and developers became mutually dependent, since both groups
benefit from gas production.296 Today, there are numerous landowner
organizations and separate associations of royalty owners.297 While they
focus at times on different issues, they have shared interests, along with
the gas developers, in ensuring that laws, policies, and economic
instruments support gas production.298
Public institutions further support this development, because gas
development will likely bring new tax revenues, create new jobs, and drive
economic activity in communities with gas resources and, perhaps,

Happen, 30 TULSA L.J. 599, 601, 603–04 (1995).
293. Id. at 601.
294. See id. at 606; see also Abrahm Lustgarten, Unfair Share: How Oil and Gas Drillers Avoid
Paying
Royalties,
PROPUBLICA
(Aug.
13,
2013,
10:20
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/unfair-share-how-oil-and-gas-drillers-avoid-paying-royalties
[https://perma.cc/ZAT8-4JCD] (discussing how companies manipulate lease agreements and data to
keep “billions of dollars in royalties out of the hands of private and government landholders”).
295. See Marie Cusick & Amy Sisk, Millions Own Gas and Oil Under Their Land. Here’s Why
Only
Some
Strike
It
Rich,
NPR
(Mar.
15,
2018,
5:01
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/15/592890524/millions-own-gas-and-oil-under-their-land-heres-whyonly-some-strike-it-rich [https://perma.cc/WP5A-YCB2].
296. See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Landowner Alliance, POGLA,
https://www.pogla.org/ [https://perma.cc/WB6M-PUG2] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
POGLA]; National Association of Royalty Owners, NARO, https://www.naro-us.org/
[https://perma.cc/TW95-H8FJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) [hereinafter NARO]; see also Si M.
Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571, 600 (1990) (discussing
the development of a Model Division Order Form by the National Association of Royalty Owners and
others).
297. See Wesley S. Speary, Article, Shortcomings of the 2013 Amendments to Pennsylvania’s
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act and the Need to Better Protect Royalty Owners’ Rights, 77 U. PITT.
L. REV. 77 (2015); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Get Out from under My Land! Hydraulic Fracturing,
Forced Pooling or Unitization, and the Role of the Dissenting Landowner, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV.
633 (2018).
298. See, e.g., POGLA, supra note 297; NARO, supra note 297.
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beyond.299 Each of these perceived benefits—even if they do not fully
materialize—tend to motivate public institutions to support gas
development. For example, local governments often promote new gas
development as a source of new tax revenues for schools, policing, and
public services.300 The promises of new jobs and local funding often
outweigh local concerns about how gas production might affect the local
environment and sense of place.301 And, when public institutions express
doubts about the wisdom of allowing new gas production, private
institutions representing gas industry workers, royalty owners, and other
gas industry interests often step in to shore up support for the gas
industry.302
Indeed, when local communities do agree to prohibit gas development,
the private institutions and legal systems associated with gas production
are often powerful enough to overcome that local opposition. For
example, after residents of Longmont, Colorado, passed a local measure
to ban new gas wells, the state Supreme Court invalidated the ban,
declaring such local measures preempted under state law.303 Although the
Colorado legislature later passed a law authorizing local governments to
regulate oil and gas drilling within their jurisdictions, questions remain
regarding the scope of this regulatory power.304 In Texas, the state
legislature preempted a local ban on fracking within the town of Denton.305
The gas industry was able to leverage its institutional power at the state
level to overcome local resistance, consistent with theories of institutional
299. See Payne, supra note 272, at 320–23.
300. Id.
301. Joel Minor, Note, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 33
STAN. ENV’T L.J. 61, 73–80 (2014).
302. See, e.g., Niall McCarthy, Oil and Gas Giants Spend Millions Lobbying to Block Climate
Change
Policies,
FORBES
(Mar.
25,
2019,
8:06
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spend-millions-lobbyingto-block-climate-change-policies-infographic/?sh=1c641af47c4f [https://perma.cc/JZ5Q-S676].
303. Michael Wines, Colorado Court Strikes Down Local Bans on Fracking, N.Y. Times (May
2,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/colorado-court-strikes-down-local-bans-onfracking.html [https://perma.cc/RKB5-KUVJ].
304. John Herrick, Some Colorado Residents Want Their Local Governments to Ban Fracking.
Here’s Why That Probably Won’t Happen, Colo. Indep. (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2020/01/06/senate-bill-181-local-government-ban-fracking/
[https://perma.cc/V4LZ-M3UW].
305. Peggy Heinkel-Wolfe, Five Years Later: Denton’s Epic Battle to Ban Fracking and Keep
Local Control, DENTON REC. CHRON. (Nov. 3, 2019), https://dentonrc.com/news/five-years-laterdentons-epic-battle-to-ban-fracking-and-keep-local-control/article_df910328-7409-5acf-b9515934ad766c12.html [https://perma.cc/WH9V-Z4XF].
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carbon lock-in.306
Gas development is further supported by private and public
institutions involved in financing development operations. As noted
above, the gas “treadmill” perpetuates technological lock-in due to the
high costs of drilling new wells, the debt used to support the drilling, and
the fact that many developers may be drilling new wells to pay off capital
costs of lower-performing existing wells.307 This technological lock-in is
clearly interrelated with institutional lock-in, as many private institutions
have hundreds of billions of dollars at stake if the debt bubble supporting
oil and gas development bursts.308 Public institutions will inevitably find
themselves enmeshed in the outfall as well, because they will likely face
the responsibility of cleaning up the financial and environmental messes
made if the natural gas industry goes bust.309 While the prospects of such
losses could potentially encourage government institutions to get ahead of
the problem and protect communities and the economy from the fallout of
a natural gas bust, public institutions have largely ignored the warnings
thus far.310 It seems more likely, consistent with the theory of carbon lockin, that institutions will continue to support the natural gas system.311
This does not mean that private and public institutions will always
align themselves with gas development interests. In response to concerns
about water quality, earthquakes, and more recently, climate change, a few
states and counties have enacted moratoria on new gas development.312
While some of the bans are arguably performative,313 some have affected
306. See Seto et al., supra note 12, at 433–35.
307. See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text.
308. MC LEAN, supra note 32, at 15, 32–33, 45–47.
309. See Justin Mikulka, How the Fracking Revolution is Killing the U.S. Oil and Gas Industry,
DESMOG (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.desmogblog.com/2020/12/22/fracking-boom-revolution-oilgas-industry [https://perma.cc/9YGS-EWAS] (noting that private companies will no longer have
money to pay off debt or fund environmental cleanup if they go bankrupt).
310. MC LEAN, supra note 32, at 82–85.
311. See Seto et al., supra note 13, at 433–35.
312. See, e.g., Res. 2017-55, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/resolution-2017-55.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BF8-TXG8].
313. For example, both Vermont and Washington have banned fracking, but neither state has any
gas production operations. Carl Etnier, Vermont First State in Nation to Ban Fracking for Oil and
Gas, VTDIGGER (May 4, 2012), https://vtdigger.org/2012/05/04/vermont-first-state-in-nation-to-banfracking-for-oil-and-gas/ [https://perma.cc/2XG6-AFU5]; Courtney Flatt, Washington Bill Would Ban
Fracking for 10 Years, OPB (Jan. 29, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/washingtonbill-would-ban-fracking-for-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/D23P-369Q].
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active fracking locations. For example, New York imposed a moratorium
on new fracking operations in an effort to protect the state’s drinking water
supplies from contamination.314 The federal government also established,
then suspended, and then reestablished, moratoria on new oil and gas
leases on public lands.315 These bans, even the performative ones, could
create new institutional dynamics that could lead to natural gas lock-out
over time.316 In fact, both California and New Mexico have pending
legislative proposals to ban fracking in their states.317 While these are
promising signs, the institutional momentum still favors natural gas
production in most places with substantial gas resources.
b. Institutional Lock-In Associated with Gas Transportation
Institutional lock-in associated with gas transportation involves its
own unique set of legal and institutional lock-in dynamics related to the
physical construction and use of interstate pipelines. While some of the
same social and institutional dynamics associated with gas production
lock-in apply to transportation pipelines, rules and practices governing
pipeline permitting and construction allow pipeline companies to develop
infrastructure despite landowner resistance.318 In addition, the regulatory
and institutional arrangements between pipeline companies, their
customers, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) create
legal and economic lock-in that reinforces the infrastructure lock-in
initiated by new pipeline construction.319
Under the Natural Gas Act, interstate pipelines are subject to

314. Thomas Kaplan, Citing Health Risks, Cuomo Bans Fracking in New York State, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/nyregion/cuomo-to-ban-fracking-in-newyork-state-citing-health-risks.html [https://perma.cc/5ME6-HG8Z].
315. Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Ari Natter, Biden Poised to Freeze Oil and Coal Leasing on Federal
Land, FIN. POST (Jan. 21, 2021), https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/biden-poised-tofreeze-oil-and-coal-leasing-on-federal-land [https://perma.cc/BVK4-JKQF].
316. See Seto et al., supra note 13, at 433–35.
317. ‘No Time to Waste’: California Bill Would Ban Fracking in State by 2027, GUARDIAN (Feb.
17, 2021, 1:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/17/fracking-california-senatebill-ban [https://perma.cc/B65S-WUVP]; Dan McKay, NM Fracking Ban Advances in Senate,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 13, 2021, 1:43 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/2359358/nm-fracking-banadvances-in-senate.html [https://perma.cc/47MB-RG5L].
318. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 346–47.
319. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (displaying a codified interplay between the three groups in the
construction of natural gas facilities).
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regulation by FERC.320 A pipeline company operates as a regulated utility,
and it must receive FERC’s authorization under Section 7 of the Natural
Gas Act prior to building the pipeline.321 To receive a Section 7 certificate,
the pipeline company must show that it will serve the public convenience
and necessity322—which in large part means the company must show there
is sufficient demand for the pipeline capacity. Section 7 certificates
include conditions requiring pipeline companies to comply with various
laws, including environmental statutes and regulations, before they
construct the pipelines.323 FERC frequently issues Section 7 certificates
before pipeline companies have received all of their environmental
permits, reasoning that it is sufficient to include conditions in certificates
that mandate compliance with environmental laws prior to commencing
construction.324 However, Section 7 certificates grant pipeline companies
the authority to exercise federal eminent domain before they obtain
environmental permits and other authorization.325 Thus, well before a
pipeline company has obtained all of its pre-construction authorizations, it
may condemn private and public property through the exercise of federal
eminent domain over unwilling landowners.326 Once the company builds
the pipeline, it will act as a common carrier, delivering gas from upstream
producers and processers to downstream users pursuant to FERCapproved tariffs establishing the terms and rates for using the pipelines.327
The costs associated with building the pipelines are recovered over time
pursuant to the terms of the tariffs.328 As a whole, the Section 7 certificate
process, the public convenience and necessity showing, and the cost
allocation methodologies create multiple layers of institutional and legal
lock-in risks.
First, the eminent domain authority allows pipeline companies to gain
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at § 717f(c).
323. Kalen, supra note 36, at 329; see also Robert Christin, Paul Korman, & Michael Pincus,
Considering the Public Convenience and Necessity in Pipeline Certificate Cases Under the Natural
Gas Act, 38 ENERGY L.J. 115, 131 (2017).
324. Kalen, supra note 36, at 329 n.66.
325. Id. at 329, 345–51.
326. Id.
327. Cost-of-Service
Rate
Filings,
FED.
ENERGY
REG.
COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-gas/overview/general-information/cost-service-ratefilings [https://perma.cc/3K43-MGCP] (last updated Aug. 14, 2020).
328. Id.
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development momentum well before they have secured all of their
required pre-construction permits and authorizations.329 If a landowner
refuses to negotiate with a pipeline company, the company may initiate
eminent domain proceedings in federal or state court, where the sole issue
is the required amount of compensation, and not whether the company’s
exercise of eminent domain is appropriate.330 FERC and the United States
Courts of Appeals are considered the appropriate fora for adjudicating the
legitimacy of the grant of eminent domain.331 Landowners, however, are
often not adequately represented before FERC due to a lack of notice or
understanding of how Section 7 certificates may affect their property
rights, and they may not have the capacity or resources to appeal FERC
decisions.332 Indeed, the eminent domain structure under the Natural Gas
Act is designed in many ways to reduce opposition to new pipeline
development and thus enables infrastructure and technological lock-in.333
Second, the convenience and necessity requirements, combined with
tariffs, rates, and cost recovery mechanisms for interstate pipelines, have
their own lock-in effects. To receive a Section 7 certificate of convenience
and necessity, a pipeline company must demonstrate there is sufficient
demand for the pipeline capacity.334 To demonstrate such need, pipeline
companies typically secure preliminary (“precedent”) commitments from
pipeline customers (called “shippers”) to use the new pipeline capacity.335
In FERC’s view, these commitments alone demonstrate market demand
for the new capacity.336 Indeed, in a few high-profile disputes for gas lines
that would each extend hundreds of miles and cost several billion dollars
to construct, FERC refused to reconcile competing analyses of projected
gas demand, relying instead on the existence of precedent agreements.337
While it is possible that projects may be cancelled if the market softens
after the precedent agreements are made but before the pipeline is built,338
this limited approach to assessing need is much more likely to either create
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Kalen, supra note 36, at 329, 345–51.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348–51.
See id. at 345–49.
See id. at 328–29; Christin et al., supra note 323, at 121.
Kalen, supra note 36, at 328–29.
See id.; Christin et al., supra note 323, at 128–29.
See Kalen, supra note 36, at 365–70.
Christin et al., supra note 323, at 132.
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gas lock-in or substantial stranded assets.339
Third, once a pipeline is constructed, lock-in is exacerbated by the
nature of interstate pipelines as common carriers and the rate structures
used to pay for their development and operation. Pipeline companies must
develop FERC-approved tariffs that establish terms and rates for gas
transportation services.340 These tariffs are designed to allow pipeline
companies to earn back their full investment plus a rate-of-return on the
pipelines and to recover operating expenses.341 Pipeline companies then
negotiate contracts with shippers based on the tariffs.342 As a general
matter, full recovery for the sunk costs in the pipelines depends upon the
companies securing a sufficient number of shippers transporting a
sufficient volume of gas.343 If the volume of gas needing transportation
drops, either the pipeline company and its investors will eat the losses or
the remaining shippers and their customers may face higher rates.344 To
avoid this outcome, federal regulations restrict and penalize early
departures from the pipeline.345 For example, if shippers with firm
pipeline contracts want to release some of their firm capacity rights, they
must obtain (and pay for) capacity release or seek a waiver.346 While
capacity release allows the pipeline capacity to be resold to other pipeline
users,347 the resale value depends on demand for the pipeline. If demand
is low, the shipper will have to pay for unused capacity. These barriers to
exit exacerbate gas lock-in.
At some point, however, despite the institutional mechanisms that
favor lock-in, the movement towards clean energy will likely reduce
pipeline use.348 The stranded cost liabilities associated with this reduction
could be enormous. An analysis by the Rocky Mountain Institute
339. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 365–70.
340. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a), (e).
341. See Kalen, supra note 36, at 363 (noting that FERC has approved rates of return that are
typically fourteen percent on new pipelines).
342. Kalen, supra note 36, at 363 n.289.
343. Id. at 363–64 (suggesting the abandonment of planned facilities that were small in scale as
to not warrant the initial costs of construction).
344. See Natural Gas Explained: Factors Affecting Natural Gas Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/factors-affecting-natural-gas-prices.php
[https://perma.cc/8ZXG-64CZ] (last updated Aug. 21, 2020).
345. 18 C.F.R. § 284.8.
346. Id. at (b)(1).
347. Id.
348. Kalen, supra note 36, at 376–77; DYSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 9–11.
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projected that declining demand for gas could lower pipeline throughput
in newly built pipelines by twenty to sixty percent, increasing costs for
contractually bound shippers by thirty to 140 percent.349 At least one
analysis projected that stranded cost liabilities for gas and oil pipelines
alone could exceed $1 trillion.350 While these risks have motivated some
legislators to intervene in FERC proceedings to oppose new pipeline
development, raising concerns that declining gas use could increase rates
for captive end-users,351 the gas industry’s recent building spree of gas
pipelines and the institutional wariness to allow built assets to retire
prematurely creates a significant risk of lock-in moving forward.352
c. Institutional Lock-In Associated with Gas-Fired Power Production
Similar lock-in dynamics apply to gas-fired power plants. As already
noted, the legal regime that applies to the electricity sector includes
numerous mechanisms that promote path dependencies.353 These include
rate regulation rules that aim to prevent stranded costs and thus perpetuate
continued reliance on existing assets354 and the reciprocal duties to serve
that encourage utility investment (and overinvestment) in energy resources
and prevent or discourage consumers from finding alternative energy
suppliers.355 Whenever utilities invest in new gas-fired power plants, the
legal system reinforces the technological lock-in regarding those
investments. This dynamic has played out with nuclear power and coalfired power, and there is little reason to believe it will not also play out
with natural gas.356 Indeed, as Professors Serkin and Vandenbergh
describe, unless regulators preemptively announce early retirement dates
for new gas-fired plants before the plants are built, it is likely that
regulators’ fears of takings claims or a general sense of fairness to the plant
owners will allow new plants to remain in service for decades, despite their
349.
350.

DYSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 41.
JAMES BROWNING, GREIG AITKEN, LYDIA PLANTE & TED NACE, PIPELINE BUBBLE 2021:
TRACKING GLOBAL OIL AND GAS PIPELINES 3 (2021), https://globalenergymonitor.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/Pipeline-Bubble-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V3D-EYLN].
351. Kalen, supra note 36, at 366.
352. Id. at 367–75.
353. See Stein, supra note 36; Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36; Hammond & Rossi, supra
note 36.
354. Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 650–51.
355. See supra notes 194–203 and accompanying text.
356. See Pierce, supra note 206, at 498–99; Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 655–68.
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harmful effects on the climate.357
In addition to the rules affecting rates, other electricity sector
institutional and legal mechanisms promote and perpetuate lock-in. For
example, utilities are expected to meet reliability requirements that are
designed to ensure that electricity will be available without disruption at
all (or most) times.358 Although utilities sometimes fail to meet these
requirements,359 various legal and market tools exist to supply reliability,
and many of these favor gas. In organized electricity markets, regional
transmission organizations procure capacity through forward-looking
markets.360 Generators bid to supply capacity at certain times and
locations, and if their bids are accepted, they commit themselves to be
available to dispatch energy at those times and places.361 These markets
tend to favor gas generation for a variety of reasons, including the fact that
gas can provide both firm and flexible supply.362 Renewable resources, in
comparison, cannot always meet the needs of the capacity market.363
Moreover, once a generator successfully clears a capacity market, it is
often included in system-wide reliability and resource planning.364 This
engenders reliance on gas plants for an extended time.
Outside of the organized markets, balkanization and outdated utility
structures favor gas. Incumbent utilities bear independent responsibility
for meeting resource and reliability requirements.365
They have
historically relied on fossil generation, including baseload coal- and gasfired power plants, hydropower, and gas peaker plants for the majority of

357. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1029–33.
358. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MAINTAINING RELIABILITY IN THE MODERN POWER SYSTEM 4
(2016),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Maintaining%20Reliability%20in%20the%20
Modern%20Power%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV3Z-ESCX].
359. Id.
360. See Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity
Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, YALE J. ON REGUL. (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/the-quiet-undoing-how-regional-electricity-market-reformsthreaten-state-clean-energy-goals/ [https://perma.cc/39U9-PHPE].
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See James Bushnell, Michaela Flagg & Erin Mansur, Capacity Markets at a Crossroads 23–
29
(Energy
Inst.
at
Haas,
Working
Paper
No.
278,
2017),
https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/wp278updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XKW-6HB9].
365. Id.
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their energy, capacity, and reliability resources.366 However, as coal
capacity is taken offline and the ecological impacts of hydropower
facilities become increasingly severe, concerns about resource adequacy
have led some utilities and regulators to push for more gas plants to replace
retiring coal plants as the West decarbonizes.367 Even when hydropower
resources are presumed to remain at their existing capacities, resource
studies for the Pacific Northwest indicate that new gas capacity is
necessary to meet near-term resource needs, in part because the balkanized
transmission management and planning system in the West made
increased reliance on renewable resources difficult.368 The studies also
show, however, the new gas plants would have a very short window of full
operation in a decarbonized energy system: under various scenario
analyses, decarbonization goals would limit newly built gas plants to
operating at seven percent of their full capacities by 2050.369 One might
assume that the owners of these gas plants would build with these capacity
constraints in mind and therefore design and finance the plants for early
obsolescence. Yet, institutional norms suggest this is unlikely to occur:
regulators do not want to endorse cost recovery structures that result in
near-term price hikes, many regulators are unlikely to authorize
investment in new power generation facilities so long as existing gas plants
are functional, and power plant owners may be restricted from
decommissioning power plants early.370 So long as the existing utility
366. Id.; see also Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era, 109
CAL. L. REV. 209 (2021) (explaining how fossil fuels provide the bulk of electricity and how grid
managers have favored fossil fuels even in competitive markets).
367. See generally Lesley Fleischman, Rachel Cleetus, Steve Clemmer, Jeff Deyette & Steve
Frenkel, Ripe for Retirement: An Economic Analysis of the U.S. Coal Fleet, 26 THE ELEC. J. 51 (2013),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Ripe-for-Retirement-An-Economic-Analysis-ofthe-US-Coal-Fleet.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8CX-ZVUX] (discussing the need to replace retiring coal
plants with cleaner alternatives).
368. See generally DAN AAS, SHARAD BHARADWAJ, AMBER MAHONE, ZACK SUBIN, TORY
CLARK & SNULLER PRICE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST PATHWAYS TO 2050: ACHIEVING AN 80%
REDUCTION
IN
ECONOMY-WIDE
GREENHOUSE
GASES
BY
2050
(2018),
http://www.cascadia.edu/discover/about/sustainability/E3_Pacific_Northwest_Pathways_to_2050.pd
f [https://perma.cc/PQ4N-V8LY] (discussing the use of gas in different models to achieve “deep
decarbonization”); CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION INST., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME:
PATHWAYS
TO
A
LOW-CARBON
FUTURE
FOR
THE
NORTHWEST
(2019),
https://www.cleanenergytransition.org/meeting-the-challenge
[https://perma.cc/G5W6-BCDE]
(presenting different models to achieve nearly 100% electric grids with a small reliance on natural
gas).
369. See LARSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 87.
370. See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 673–74.
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structure remains locked in, natural gas lock-in will likely persist.
Indeed, institutional lock-in permeates all segments of the gas sector.
While this section has focused on the ways in which institutions enable
and reinforce the most capital-intensive segments of the gas sector,
institutional lock-in affects end uses as well. Many of the private and
public institutions that reinforce lock-in for pipelines and power plants
similarly enable lock-in of major industrial uses of gas, including plastics
and chemical plants, through lax environmental regulation, tax incentives,
and other programs designed to attract and retain industries.371 Institutions
also encourage lock-in of residential uses. These institutional influences
go hand-in-hand with behavioral and discursive lock-in, discussed next.
3. Behavioral and Discursive Forces Creating Gas Lock-In
Behavioral lock-in may be one of the most pernicious contributors to
continued lock-in, particularly for fossil assets that are used and owned by
millions of people. Humans are creatures of habit; once we develop
certain practices, we tend to maintain them, particularly when continuity
is the path of least resistance.372 Humans are also highly social creatures,
which makes us susceptible to marketing and messaging,373 particularly
when narratives affirm our beliefs or reinforce our behaviors. These
realities enable and perpetuate natural gas lock-in, including lock-in of end
use appliances like furnaces, water heaters, and cooking stoves.
Both gas and oil have benefitted from these twin realities, albeit for
different reasons. By briefly considering the behavioral and narrative
stickiness that has increased our reliance on oil, we can get a better sense
of how behavioral and discursive lock-in occurs.
In the case of oil, marketing of personal cars has always tapped into
human desires and behaviors. Car ownership is anything but easy: from
the purchasing process, to securing reliable and affordable parking, to
371. See Roberts, supra note 2 (discussing decarbonization of large industries).
372. Humans Are Hard-Wired to Follow the Path of Least Resistance, SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 21,
2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/02/170221101016.htm [https://perma.cc/M2EP63Q9]; Ian Newby-Clark, We Are Creatures of Habit, PSYCH. TODAY (July 17, 2009),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/creatures-habit/200907/we-are-creatures-habit
[https://perma.cc/W4FR-7ZZZ].
373. See Cherise Czaban, Understanding Human Behavior Can Improve Your Marketing
Strategy, I4 BUS. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.i4biz.com/best-practice/understanding-humanbehavior-can-improve-your-marketing-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/S944-KG89].
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regularly fueling the car at gas stations, to paying for insurance, to
navigating roads that may be poorly maintained, to dealing with
congestion and unpredictable delays, to paying for costly maintenance and
repairs, the use of personal vehicles is a complex, expensive, and
frustrating endeavor.374 And yet, cars proliferate American society. This
is partly because most U.S. cities and towns were built around the car and
because public transit in the United States is often limited, expensive, and
unreliable.375 But it is mostly because car use is a habit, reinforced by
relentless marketing and messaging.376 Vehicle ownership is a dominant
status symbol, a rite of passage, and a symbol of freedom in the United
States,377 thanks to a story the car companies have spun for more than a
century. Regardless of how difficult car ownership actually is, Americans
are used to owning cars, and so Americans continue to buy and use cars.
That is the power of lock-in.
In the case of natural gas, both the discourse and habits are slightly
different, but they perpetuate lock-in nonetheless. For more than a
century, the natural gas industry has used narratives to encourage the use
of gas in homes and buildings.378 As reported in Mother Jones, ad
campaigns from the 1930s were touting gas as a clean and efficient fuel
suitable for cooking and heating.379 In the 1950s and 60s, ads featured
movie stars encouraging kitchen remodeling projects that would add gas
cooking stoves.380 In the 1970s, when fuel shortages and energy crises
forced most Americans to conserve energy, the gas industry promoted the

374. Jeff S. Bartlett, The Cost of Car Ownership Over Time, CONSUMER REPS.,
https://www.consumerreports.org/car-maintenance/the-cost-of-car-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/P9HD-DZAT] (Apr. 8, 2021); The True Cost of Car Ownership, LIFE LANES BY
PROGRESSIVE,
https://www.progressive.com/lifelanes/on-the-road/auto-car-ownership-cost/
[https://perma.cc/R7Z5-FJ3N] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
375. Joseph Stromberg, The Real Reason American Public Transportation Is Such a Disaster,
VOX (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:49 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/8/10/9118199/public-transportationsubway-buses [https://perma.cc/BH92-8JPA].
376. How Modern Car Buying Habits Can Be Used to Create Highly-Targeted Marketing,
BDEX, https://www.bdex.com/data-driven-direct-marketing-auto-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/7JTNX9U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
377. Diana Shi, What Does the All-American Car Symbolize?, VICE (Jan. 7, 2017, 6:45 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/yp5azm/american-car-history-through-painting-photography-show
[https://perma.cc/A7KJ-M75A].
378. Leber, supra note 100; Sheppard & Battistoni, supra note 49.
379. Leber, supra note 100.
380. Id.
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“installation of high-efficiency gas equipment.”381 This message seems to
have had particular salience that lingers today, as the gas industry regularly
emphasizes the efficiency rates of gas appliances in comparison to electric
ones.382 Other early narratives have been recycled as well: while Marlene
Dietrich provided star power to the gas campaigns of the mid-twentieth
century, star chefs are used today to promote gas.383 And gas’s image as
a clean fuel persists, despite the evidence showing it causes elevated
indoor air pollution.384 Indeed, one could look at the reputation of gas as
a “bridge” fuel as merely an extension of this successful and sustained
campaign to promote gas. Of the fossil fuels, gas has uniquely benefitted
from a reputation as a “clean” fuel that has benign effects on public health
and the environment, a “bridge” fuel that enables the transition to clean
energy, a “reliable” fuel that can be dispatched quickly to mitigate
unreliability caused by renewable resources, and an “elite, yet affordable”
fuel for professional and home chefs.385 This reputation has encouraged
and enabled deployment of gas infrastructure from production wells to
power plants to homes.
Once it exists in homes, it persists in homes. A number of behavioral
factors contribute to this inertia. First, habits are, by definition, sticky, and
the use of gas appliances has become a habit for many.386 Much as owners
of pipelines and power plants are disinclined to retire them early,
homeowners are unlikely to replace their home appliances until it is
absolutely necessary or until a major disruptive event, such as a major
remodel or move, compels active decision-making regarding the type of
appliances the homeowners will use.387 Second, humans prefer easy

381. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE AND REGIONAL POLICIES THAT PROMOTE ENERGY
EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS CARRIED OUT BY ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES 7 (2007),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_EPAct_Sec._139_Rpt_t
o_CongressFINAL_PUBLIC_RELEASE_VERSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7N9-A24W].
382. See Leber, supra note 100.
383. Id.
384. Id.; RMI, FOSSIL FUELS IN BUILDINGS, supra note 23; Lauren Sommer, Fixing Stove Hoods
to Keep Pollution Out of the Kitchen, NPR (Sept. 4, 2013, 5:25 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/09/10/219012757/kitchen-range-hoods-may-not-be-aseffective-as-they-claim [https://perma.cc/M8CP-H3HY].
385. See Leber, supra note 100; see also Christina Nunez, Can Natural Gas Be a Bridge to Clean
Energy?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/can-naturalgas-be-a-bridge-to-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/77V2-688P] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
386. See Gross & Hanna, supra note 273.
387. See Roberts, supra note 273.
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solutions over “better” ones, particularly if the discourse regarding the
comparative benefits of different devices is unclear.388 Accordingly, if a
home has already been configured to support gas appliances, and if
replacing them with electric appliances will involve additional steps,
contractors, time, or money, homeowners will likely choose the path of
least resistance and replace gas appliances with gas appliances. Third,
humans tend to like what we have, even if we would not buy it new.389
Through a phenomenon called the “endowment effect,” people are often
unwilling to give up useful, yet undesirable, goods that they would never
buy in the first place.390 A person who owns a gas furnace or stove is
therefore unlikely to replace it. Fourth, humans are not rational economic
actors.391 We typically do a poor job of calculating the lifetime costs or
benefits of owning equipment like appliances; and we are much more
likely to respond to near-term price incentives for appliances even if we
will pay more to use them over time.392 If a state or utility offers rebates
or discounts on new gas appliances, many people will likely make new
investments in gas.
These behavioral and discursive lock-in dynamics are mutually
reinforcing. Once a person decides to invest in a new gas appliance, she
will tend to seek out affirmations that the investment was wise.393 That
may lead the person to purchase additional appliances, to convince others
to purchase gas appliances, or to hold onto the appliances for an extended
period of time. Indeed, there tends to be a very limited opportunity to
prevent behavioral lock-in, and that is before the technology is deployed.
That, in turn, requires that the discourse and institutions are similarly
aligned so as to avoid new technology lock-in.
Collectively, each of the drivers of gas lock-in—technology,
388. See Daniel Markovitz, How to Avoid Rushing to Solutions When Problem-Solving, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 27, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/11/how-to-avoid-rushing-to-solutions-whenproblem-solving [https://perma.cc/HJ48-2G4K].
389. See Lucas, supra note 37, at 132–35; see also Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the
Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 47 (2017) (discussing factors that make humans resistant to adopting
a carbon tax, even when the alternative, dealing with climate change, is far worse).
390. Lucas, supra note 37, at 130–32, 132 n.92.
391. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (1st ed. 2011).
392. See John T. Gourville & Dilip Soman, Pricing and the Psychology of Consumption, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/09/pricing-and-the-psychology-of-consumption
[https://perma.cc/YK7K-Y7B5].
393. See Uwe Peters, What is the Function of Confirmation Bias?, ERKENNTNIS 2 (2020),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MRU8RNM].
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institutional, legal, behavioral, and discursive lock-in—reinforces the
others. When applied to the U.S. gas sector, lock-in appears to be
especially expansive and forceful. The drivers of lock-in affect each
component of the gas system, from development to transportation to use.
These drivers create multi-level positive feedbacks that strengthen the
lock-in effects at other levels. The development of new gas wells induces
the development of new pipelines, the construction of new gas power
plants, and the installation of new gas appliances. Pipeline expansion,
especially overexpansion, promotes new gas production and increased or
new gas uses. New residential gas hook-ups justify the construction of
new gas pipelines and new wells. And so it goes: new technology begets
new technology. And once the new technology is built, private and public
institutions, legal regimes, behavioral forces, and narratives work to keep
the technology online.
While all types of fossil fuels are subject to these lock-in dynamics,
gas is by far the most pervasive because of its diverse, multi-scalar
applications, and millions of direct and indirect users. That makes gas
lock-in a particular challenge to overcome as we seek to rapidly
decarbonize our energy sector.
IV. BREAKING GAS LOCK-IN: A PROPOSED RESEARCH AND ACTION
AGENDA
The goal of this paper is to present a narrative case that natural gas
lock-in is a particular challenge to decarbonization. If this narrative is
accurate, the likely extent of existing gas lock-in could delay or undermine
efforts to decarbonize our energy sector. Even though the technologies
necessary for clean electrification are available and affordable, and even
though the rapid growth of renewable energy, storage resources, and
electric vehicles suggest that a quick transition to zero-carbon energy is
feasible, the incumbency benefits that natural gas enjoys could thwart a
quick and equitable transition. Policies must therefore focus not only on
rapidly moving towards clean electrification but also on policies that
overcome gas lock-in.
Understanding the extent of that lock-in is necessary for smart policy
development and to prevent unintended consequences of policies designed
to eliminate natural gas. A number of scholars have recognized the
potential risks associated with stranded gas assets and proposed several
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thoughtful and smart solutions to addressing those risks.394 However,
there appear to be no analyses that discuss how end users might be affected
by policies that either seek to ban new investments or rapidly phase out
existing upstream gas facilities. Because the stickiness of gas runs through
the entire system, at all scales, we should assume that gas infrastructure in
homes and buildings will remain in place for decades to come.395 There
seems, therefore, to be a substantial risk that addressing only major gas
infrastructure could have a substantial impact on vulnerable populations,
who are likely least able to make early replacements of any gas equipment
in their homes. Almost every proposal to prevent additional gas lock-in
by preemptively addressing the risks of major stranded assets will likely
increase gas prices for the end users, at least in the near term.396 What will
the impacts of those proposals be downstream? Specifically, what will
happen to the locked-in homeowners if gas supplies quickly shrink? We
need a deeper understanding of the full scale of existing gas lock-in to
understand the risks it presents. At the same time, we cannot wait to
prevent new lock-ins from developing, as that will only worsen the likely
risks to vulnerable end users. Accordingly, this article ends with three
recommendations for next steps.
First, the United States needs to develop a better understanding of the
extent and risks of gas lock-in. Thus far, most empirical analyses of fossil
fuel lock-in focus on major assets, or only on discrete segments of fossil
fuel infrastructure. While they suggest the extent of gas lock-in is
extensive—some existing assessments of fossil fuel and infrastructure
lock-in indicate that stranded asset liabilities could run in the trillions of
dollars—they do not consider the full scale of the gas sector. Nor do they
consider the mutually reinforcing drivers of gas lock-in. As such, they
seem to only hint at the full scale of lock-in. Accordingly, a priority for
addressing gas lock-in should be to conduct an empirical analysis of the
extent and nature of gas lock-in in the United States, with a specific focus
on how gas lock-in affects end users, particularly those who may be
disproportionately impacted by rising prices associated with regulating or
394. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 36, at 583–603; Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1037–
74; Kalen, supra note 36, at 359–75; Hammond & Rossi, supra note 36, at 678–91.
395. See Payne, supra note 271, at 308, 329; Gross & Hanna, supra note 273.
396. See Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1037–74 (noting that it may be necessary to
accelerate depreciation on new gas-fired power plants to ensure that necessary plants are built and
retired before the end of their economically useful lives); Kalen, supra note 36, at 359–75; Hammond
& Rossi, supra note 36, at 678–91.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3854992

NATURAL GAS LOCK IN MELISSA POWERS DRAFT 5.28.21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

201x]

5/27/21 9:30 AM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

161

phasing out major gas infrastructure.
Second, policymakers and advocates should oppose new gas
infrastructure deployment, and not wait until an empirical analysis is
complete. Natural gas lock-in results from the deployment of new
technology; the other drivers of gas lock-in reinforce the path
dependencies created by new technologies.397 Therefore, policymakers
and advocates should continue to focus on avoiding new gas lock-in by
acting quickly and aggressively to prevent the development of new natural
gas infrastructure and equipment. Local and state governments can follow
the lead of a number of other American cities, including several in
California, by banning any expansion of new natural gas infrastructure into
new or retrofitted commercial and residential buildings.398 State utility
regulators should also use their existing authority over resource
procurement and planning to prevent new investments in natural gas
infrastructure and to shift all the risks that the investments may become
stranded onto utilities and their investors, rather than onto their
customers.399 The federal government should follow through with
President Biden’s commitments to prevent new oil and gas drilling on
public lands and to eliminate federal subsidies.400 FERC should also apply
greater scrutiny to new natural gas projects—including export terminals
and interstate pipelines—to ensure they will remain in the public interest
as the energy system changes.401 Finally, environmental advocates and
activists should continue to use advocacy and litigation to prevent new gas

397.
398.

Unruh, supra note 12, at 827–28.
Irina Ivanova, Cities are Banning Natural Gas in New Homes, Citing Climate Change, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cities-are-banning-natural-gas-innew-homes-because-of-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/7DSZ-A7Z6].
399. See generally ANDREAS THANOS & KIERA ZITELMAN, NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION
INFRASTRUCTURE REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION: A REVIEW OF STATE PROGRAMS, NAT’L
ASS’N OF REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS (2020), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/45E90C1E-155D-0A36-31FEA68E6BF430EE [https://perma.cc/4ATX-U427] (discussing modernization programs utilized by
utility commissions to replace existing infrastructure).
400. See Biden Administration Suspends New Oil, Gas Drilling Permits on Federal Land,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 21, 2021, 7:46 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bidenadministration-suspends-new-oil-gas-drilling-permits-on-federal-land-01611276375
[https://perma.cc/8QUU-5LQ4].
401. CONG. RSCH. SERV., INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SITING: FERC POLICY AND
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
(2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180621_R45239_e50e9741cc659c66408803c2d5d0da5916e
28b4c.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K3Q-YD8C].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3854992

NATURAL GAS LOCK IN MELISSA POWERS DRAFT 5.28.21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

162

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

5/27/21 9:30 AM

[Vol. XX

investments.402 While there may be situations in which new natural gas
assets are necessary to meet resource needs for a short duration, regulators
should impose a high burden of persuasion on the developers to justify
such investments and should preschedule the retirement dates for those
facilities so they do not operate in perpetuity.403
Third, while many of the same tools can be deployed to accelerate the
retirement of existing natural gas infrastructure, an ad hoc approach will
almost certainly produce subpar outcomes. For example, stringent
regulation of emissions from gas infrastructure could increase prices for
consumers who have become reliant on abundant and affordable gas.
Massive amounts of assets could become stranded if facilities quickly
become uneconomical. If a large number of existing gas customers
replace gas appliances for electric ones, gas distribution utilities could go
bankrupt, threatening their employees’ pensions. Finally, unplanned
transitions from gas could threaten energy system reliability. Therefore,
this article recommends that federal and state agencies collaborate to
develop a comprehensive strategy for phasing out gas infrastructure. The
strategy would not only chart a path for replacing existing gas
infrastructure with electric equipment—it would also create a plan for
ensuring the transition from gas to clean electrification is equitable.
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth of natural gas infrastructure since the early 2000s,
combined with economic, institutional, legal, behavioral, and narrative
forces, have locked the United States into decades of continued reliance
on natural gas.404 Although many researchers have recognized the risks of
major gas infrastructure lock-in, the drivers of lock-in likely make the U.S.
gas system particularly resistant to reform. This is because gas lock-in
occurs at multiple scales and across multiple sectors, each of which is
subject to lock-in forces that are mutually reinforcing. Unless we develop
a better understanding of the full extent of gas lock-in, we run the risk of
enacting policies that will either fail to adequately address gas lock-in or
that will hurt vulnerable gas end users.
402. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1054; see Mike Henchen & Kiley Kroh, A New
Approach to America’s Rapidly Aging Gas Infrastructure, RMI (Jan. 6, 2020), https://rmi.org/a-newapproach-to-americas-rapidly-aging-gas-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/C2JB-C9BJ].
403. Serkin & Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 1073–74.
404. See Payne, supra note 271, at 329; Gross & Hanna, supra note 273.
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Understanding and addressing gas lock-in is also critical for quick and
equitable clean electrification. Several analyses now show that the United
States can rapidly and affordably decarbonize our energy system, but they
all hinge on replacing fossil fuel end-uses with electric devices. Although
the technology is available, carbon lock-in dynamics could suppress the
deployment of clean energy technologies. By developing a fuller
understanding of the extent of gas lock-in, we will be able to develop
strategies to break free from gas and “electrify everything.”
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